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The level of violence has not only increased constantly over the last 
decades, but has also shifted in nature from conventional to unconventional. 
Given these circumstances, Romania’s national interests call for the 
development of unconventional capabilities that are necessary in order to deal 
with current and future low intensity conflicts.  
This thesis analyzes the influence of language training and cultural 
understanding on the overall success of counterinsurgency campaigns. 
Examining some situations where the U.S. and British forces carried out counter-
insurgency operations, this project reveals that ground troops with foreign 
language skills and cultural training were able to work more efficient with the 
local population. Cultural awareness facilitated communication and developed 
interpersonal trust. Additionally, language and cultural training enhanced military 
personnel’s ability to understand the operational environment and to make a 
more selective use of force.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to promote a departure from conventional 
military training, but rather to propose the development of new Romanian military 
capabilities, the performance of which will increase through a better exploitation 
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Understanding future warfare is the most important responsibility of 
those who must defend a nation from future enemies 
Major General Perry M. Smith1 
A. CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS 
A decade after the end of the Cold War, people have started to realize that 
the period of expected peace and prosperity failed to materialize, and that the 
world is not safer as a result. Neither the end of the military rivalry between the 
East and the West nor the collapse of Soviet Union brought the expected 
improvements to international security. On the contrary, even more than before 
one witnesses a continued degradation of the security environment. This 
phenomenon has tended to be most prominent “in those countries where 
liberalization of the economy has proceeded more rapidly than the expansion of 
citizenship rights and the consolidation of newly democratic institutions” (Davis, 
2003, p. 4).  
The decrease of state authority over its constituencies or, in some cases, 
even the disintegration of the state, altogether, has triggered a migration of the 
centers of power from the state level into the hands of various non-state actors. 
Such a shift in the base of power has given birth to what Ralph Peters (2003) 
calls a “new warrior class,” i.e., a class that is more ruthless than its 
predecessors, capable of operating on a global scale (p. 16). As Kaldor (1999) 
noted, the main factors that contributed to this erosion, especially in the field “of 
the monopoly of legitimate violence” were 1) “the availability of surplus weapons,” 
2) “the discrediting of socialist ideologies,” 3) “the disintegration of totalitarian 
empires,” and 4) “the withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes” (p. 4). 
Pondering how these challenges might be surmounted, Hammond (2001), 
noting that since the ambition of many warring elements is “not specifically 
military,” and that their chosen means encompass both “low technology, mass 
                                            
1 Smith, P.M. (1989). Foreword. In R, Paschall LIC 2010: Special Operations and 
Unconventional Warfare. New York: Brassey’s Inc.  
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violence” and “high technology warfare,” predicted that such factors would 
profoundly affect the way wars will be conducted within the next century, (p. 34). 
While the latter statement raises financial and organizational questions that 
cannot be answered by many existing political entities, low intensity violence 
offers a cheaper way of waging war, especially for the newly emerging sub-
national groups as Al-Qaeda and the like. The attacks against the US on 
September 11, 2001, Spain on March 11, 2004, Indonesia and the most recent 
one in North Osetia, to name just a few, testify how destructive and global 
terrorism has become.  
During the last decade, low intensity violence has manifested itself in 
numerous forms, ranging from ethnic and religious conflicts to narco-trafficking 
and organized crime. This tends to underscore the benefits of globalization, 
which, according to Kaldor, can be understood as the “intensification of global 
interconnectedness –political, economical, military and cultural”, movements that 
have been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in levels of violence 
(Kaldor, 1999, p. 3). As David Charters says, we have witnessed a transition in 
the nature of conflict that has gone from “communal violence to terrorist 
insurgency” (Charters, 1989, p. 195). Examples of this in today’s world abound: 
airplanes are hijacked and turned into killing devises; trains and busses are 
blown up; innocent citizens are taken hostage; and violence driven by ethnic and 
religious intolerance is likely nearing an all-time high. In an effort to gain 
international recognition for their cause, terrorists strike apparently indiscriminate 
political leaders and civilians, women and children, regardless of their 
nationalities. 
The numerous connections which blurred the distinction between foreign 
and domestic threats, on both the national and the international levels, have 
increased with global violence. According to Kaldor, this blurring has been 
heightened because of the difficulty to clearly differentiate:  
between war (usually defined as violence between states or 
organized political groups for political motives), organized crime 
(violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private 
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purpose, usually financial gain) and large-scale violation of human 
rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups 
against individuals) (Kaldor, 1999p. 3- 4). 
This loss of distinction between nations has been spurred on, in part, by 
the many technological advances being experienced today. Taking advantage of 
some of these technological developments has enabled some groups in this new 
class of insurgents to join forces, thus forming ever stronger transnational 
organizations. However, in whatever ways technology has been used to enhance 
transnational goals, insurgents must still retain their ability to act locally and rally 
people’s support for their cause.  
For example, even Al Qaeda must rely on the support of other like-minded 
organizations around the world to extend its own capabilities to affect the global 
socio-political climate (e.g., they require safe places to set up their training 
camps, stockpile their arsenal and plan for future operations without fearing that 
security agencies may impair their activities). This tends to be especially true in 
those places where a state’s control over its constituency is very limited. Al 
Qaeda’s decision to move its headquarters from Sudan to the safer haven 
provided by Afghanistan (upon the ascension to power of the Taliban regime) is 
illustrative in this regard. 
Equally important is an insurgent entity’s capability to rally popular support 
for their cause through the use of political mobilization. Typically, such groups 
rely on symbols and ideas that are relevant to the target population to accomplish 
this. In this way, an insurgent movement is enabled to set up façade 
organizations to act as fronts for legitimacy in order to conduct propaganda in 
support of their actions and recruit new members. For example, it is widely 
believed that the London-based Jama’at al-Muhajirun is helping Osama bin 
Laden, not only to direct his message to the Muslim community, but also to rally 
their support for his International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders (Verton, 2003, p. 84). Such activity is reminiscent of the abundance of 
communist-inspired liberation fronts that flourished across the globe throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s—from Europe to Asia, South America and Africa. The 
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difference with Al Qaeda, however, is that the sponsor is not a state, but a sub-
national organization (whose goal, it says, is not intended to impose a new 
ideology on the world, but rather to bring to an end Western military supremacy 
by depriving it of its economic power). According to Osama bin Laden, “It is 
important to hit the economy of the United States, which is the base of its military 
power” (as cited in Verton, 2003, p. 83). The goal of his endeavor, according to 
bin Laden, is to “liberate” Muslim lands from US and their allied military forces. 
These trends have caught many defense establishments unprepared 
because, “for the last 50 years or so, the military has focused on state vs. state 
wars” while violence has moved “downwards to the individual level” (Cebrowski, 
2003, p.1). Cebrowski also believes that, despite the fact that throughout 
recorded history warfare has been associated inevitably with human behavior, 
decision makers’ have tended to ignore most challenges to security that require a 
different kind of solution than that which they were prepared to provide 
(Cebrowski, 2004, p. 2). Thus, military planners have tended to prepare 
extensively to possess highly technological warfare capabilities, having begun 
with the premise that a technologically superior force will prevail over a less 
technologically advanced force. In fact, however, one encounters an increasing 
incidence of low intensity, mass violent behavior when surveying warfare over 
the past several decades. This is pointed out by Daniel Marston when he writes 
that only 12% of all the confrontations following the Second World War could be 
categorized as conventional, while the others had an evident irregular character 
(Marston, 2004, p. 4). Many world leaders disregarded the warning U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy gave more than forty years ago (as he focused on 
what many assumed to be the greatest challenge at that time, namely world 
nuclear supremacy),: 
The free World’s security can be endangered not only by a nuclear 
attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, 
regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, 
infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal 
revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare, or a series of 
limited wars (as cited in Kelly, 1989, p. ix). 
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B. CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
The deterioration of the security environment, in which a growing number 
of non-state actors challenge the tendency of many states to maintain a 
monopoly on warfare, increases the complexity of the decision-making process in 
the foreign and security policies of states. 
Romania’s National Security Strategy (NSS), while acknowledging the 
dangers posed by non-military actions which can affect economic, financial, 
social and environmental fields (especially domestic non-military actions), 
identifies that the risk of “major threats of classic military type” are less probable 
in the near future (Security strategy, 1999, Chapter 4). The NSS has identified 
that the most immediate and important threats are as follows: 
• possible negative developments at the sub-regional level, in the area 
of democratization, human rights and economic development, which 
might result in serious crises, with destabilizing effects over a large 
area;  
• proliferation of mass destruction weapons, nuclear materials and 
technologies, non-conventional arms and lethal devices;  
• proliferation and development of terrorist networks, transnational 
organized crime, illegal trafficking in people, drugs, arms and 
ammunition, strategic and radioactive materials;  
• clandestine migration and the emergence of some massive flows of 
refugees;  
• actions inciting extremism, intolerance, separatism and xenophobia 
that might affect Romania and the advancement of democratic values;  
• gaps between the levels of enforcing security and the stability of the 
states in the proximity of Romania;  
• limited access of the Romanian state to some regional resources and 
opportunities that are important for the attainment of the national 
interests (Security strategy, 1999, Chapter 4). 
In order to counter these non-classical, asymmetric threats, Romania's 
NSS includes “deliberate armed and non-armed actions aimed at affecting 
national security by causing direct or indirect consequences on the country’s 
economic and social life” (Security Strategy, 1999, Chapter 4). Among Romania’s 
endeavors, some of the most important are: 
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• Transnational and international political terrorism, including its 
biological and cyber forms;  
• Acts infringing upon the safety of domestic and international 
transportation networks;  
• Individual or group actions that target illegal access to computer 
systems;  
• Activities aimed at deliberately adversely affecting Romania’s 
international image --under various forms and circumstances--, 
activities which negatively impact Romania’s credibility and reliability in 
complying with the commitments which she has undertaken;  
• Economic-financial attacks;  
• Deliberate provocation of environmental catastrophes (Security 
Strategy, 1999, Chapter 4) 
In order to avoid such things, the Romanian Armed Forces must be able 
“to prevent, deter, and if necessary, defeat any aggressor that threatens and 
endangers the security of the Romanian state, simultaneously providing the 
capability to participate in conflict prevention, crisis management and collective 
defense at regional levels” (Military Strategy, 2001, Introduction). In keeping with 
these stated ambitions, the four pillars for the Romanian Armed Forces are: 
1) Reliable defense capability – i.e., a constant readiness and capability to 
act against all possible risks within the security environment. 
2) Restructuring and modernization – including the creation of small and 
flexible military structures, able to deploy on short notice and have self-sustaining 
logistical capabilities. Moreover, a special focus will be placed on enhancing 
troops’ equipment through both the modernization of the existing one and the 
purchase of new. 
3) Intensified operational partnerships – bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships with NATO allies and other foreign nations to enhance security. 
4) Gradual integration – into both European and Euro-Atlantic military 
structures (i.e., the ability to operate effectively with other members’ states 
armies). (Military Strategy, 2001, Introduction) 
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C. BACKGROUND  
A nation’s armed forces are usually a powerful instrument of national 
power. Therefore, throughout history keeping the armed forces prepared for war 
has often been of paramount concern for national rulers. Ever since the demise 
of the Warsaw Pact, Romania’s decision-makers have usually acknowledged the 
importance of its armed forces. In doing so, Romania has tended to promote a 
steady policy in keeping with the general European trend of endorsing a gradual 
reduction of military strength, coupled with strategies for professionalizing the 
military establishment.  
However, the turning point for Romania came in 1994, when Romania 
became a member of the Partnership for Peace program (PfP). As a result, in 
only a few years the Romanian Armed Force gradually downsized from a total 
strength of over 300,000 personnel in 1989 to about 119,000 in 2004. As outlined 
in Force Project 2007, the total estimated strength will be 90,000 by 2007 
(including 75,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians)2 divided into two main 
components: 1) active and 2) territorial. Simultaneously, a big effort has been 
made to replace Romania’s outdated military equipment, a process that has 
already begun, but will continue for many years (partly because it tends to be one 
of the more costly phases of a nation’s military transformation). Accordingly, the 
Romanian Armed Forces underwent an annual Membership Action Plan3 (MAP) 
cycle to complete NATO integration requirements starting in 1999. As a result of 
this process, the new Romanian structure will consist of two types of forces: 
• Deployable forces with strong, interoperable, deployable, sustainable, 
mobile capabilities with hi-tech equipment, able to participate abroad, 
without host nation support and to combat terrorist threats 
                                            
2 Figures were presented at the Romanian Defence Ministry Assessment for the first 
semester 2004 and represent the estimated strength for the Romanian Armed Forces at the end 
of the restructuring process. Retrieved on August 29, 2004 from 
http://www.Presamil.ro/OM/2004/31/pag.23.htm 
3 Membership Action Plan (MAP) was introduced by the Washington Summit in April 1999 in 
order to supervise the transformation process of the aspiring NATO members. For further details 
see Simon, J (2000). NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Prospects for the Next Round 
of Enlargement. Retrieved on October 25, 2004 from http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF45B.pdf  
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• In-place forces able to repel any aggression until the Alliance provides 
support (Romanian Defence, 2004, p. 5). 
Besides structural and technological reforms, much effort has been spent 
to shape the future of doctrinaire approaches. Currently, there is an urgency in 
setting up a legal framework that would allow the Romanian Armed Forces to 
participate in regional and international initiatives that are aimed at promoting 
stability and cooperation.  
With this in mind, the Supreme Council for the National Defense has 
approved the National Security Strategy and Military Strategy; the government 
has adopted the White Book; and the Defense Ministry designed different 
strategies to employ different kinds of forces. The aforementioned amounts to a 
departure from the old non-involvement doctrine, which has been evidenced by 
Romanian contingents being deployed, in conjunction with other NATO forces, 
throughout the Balkans, the Caucasus and Africa and, more recently, in Asia and 
the Middle East. For the last three years, the Romanian Armed Forces, along 
with U.S. and NATO forces, have been involved, in Afghanistan and Iraq, proving 
their desire to take on a more strategic role in international crises. This was 
acknowledged by Romanian President Ion Iliescu when he said, “Romania’s 
strategic interests will not be performed on the borders anymore, but in most of 
the situations far away from them, and when needed we rely on our allies help to 
defend our national integrity” (Iliescu, 2004, Pro memoria). 
As a direct result of the progress in achieving its military aims and 
willingness to involve itself in international affairs, Romania was finally accepted 
into NATO in April 2004. Still, this may not be enough to address future 
unconventional challenges. As recently acknowledged by the Romanian Foreign 
Minister, upcoming duties of the Romanian Armed Forces may commit more 
troops to collective security operations outside the country. In such endeavors, 
the Romanian military will be asked to work in highly integrated alliances to 
support national strategic interests (in places such as the Western Balkans, 
Caucasus and Central Asia) (Geoana, 2004, online). Because the enemy, in 
many of these instances, may lack financial and other resources readily available 
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to states, they, may choose to avoid direct confrontations with regular troops, 
instead reverting to the use of small war hit-and-run tactics (i.e., raids, 
ambushes, terrorism, etc.). The use of such tactics can be seen in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, where insurgents are challenging the authority of the newly installed 
governments. Therefore, a bigger emphasis should be placed on peacekeeping 
operations for the conventional forces. At the same time, Special Operation 
Forces (SOF) might become increasingly involved in unconventional warfare, 
foreign internal defense efforts and counter-terrorism as the primary mission and 
coalition support as secondary mission. 
D. DEFINITIONS  
Because many authors hold divergent views concerning the essence of 
small wars, this thesis will present definitions that will try to embrace the more 
cogent views—views that will constitute the basis of subsequent analyses.  
According to the United States Department of Defense (DOD), 
unconventional warfare (UW) encompasses:  
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally 
of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by 
indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained 
equipped, supported, and directed in various degrees by an 
external source. It includes, but it is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, 
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional 
assisted recovery. (DOD, 2004, Dictionary of Military Terms) 
The main characteristic of this form of warfare, as Huntington asserted, “is 
that the strategically weaker side assumes tactical offensive in selected forms, 
times and places” (Huntington, 1962, p. xvi). In their struggle, the two camps 
often pursue different strategies in support of their goals. On the one hand, the 
insurgents are “organized indigenous group[s] outside the established governing 
structure seeking “to weaken, modify, or replace existing governing authority” 
through the use of force and illegal methods (Molnar et al., 1966, p.3). According 
to Steven Metz, an insurgency may be defined as “the use of low-level, 
protracted violence to overthrow a political system or force some sort of 
fundamental change in the political and economic status quo” (Metz, 1993, p. 6). 
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On the other hand, the governmental forces may try to counter subversive 
actions and defeat the rebels by using the instruments of national power. 
According to the US DOD counterinsurgency encompasses “those military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat insurgency” (DOD, 2004, Dictionary of Military Terms). 
Therefore, because of their relationship with one another, insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies should be discussed in conjunction with each other. 
E. PURPOSE 
Striving to achieve structural and technical integration of the Romanian 
Armed Forces with its NATO allies, Romanian decision makers have tended to 
focus heavily on restructuring and modernizing the Romanian military (often 
attempting to match the technological competence of the U.S. or British [UK] 
Armed Forces) almost to the point of neglecting preparation for unconventional 
warfare.  
The purpose of this thesis is to show that unconventional warfare has a 
different set of rules than does conventional warfare and, therefore, that 
conventional tactical proficiency does not suffice in combating insurgencies. The 
intent of this thesis is neither to promote a departure from conventional training, 
nor to diminish its role in the professional development of military leaders. 
Rather, the need for unconventional training will be advocated, with an emphasis 
on matters that can give military personnel the kind of knowledge and 
understanding needed to cope with the irregular threats envisaged by the NSS. 
This thesis postulates that acquiring unconventional training can make a 
difference in the subsequent progress of a campaign against forces using 
irregular tactics. It makes the argument that only an intimate understanding of 
operational environments often associated with unconventional warfare, coupled 
with language proficiency and cultural awareness, can lead to success in the 
conduct of irregular warfare. 
Given the Romanian Armed Force involvement in counterinsurgencies 
abroad (i.e., in Afghanistan and Iraq), the main criteria for choosing the U.S and 
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British cases is the introduction of external military support to defeat an 
insurgency. Because Malaya and Vietnam are over researched cases, this thesis 
will examine some understudied cases (i.e., Indian Wars, Philippine and South 
Arabian insurgencies). 
Although it is not as evident that Indian Wars had the characteristics of a 
foreign intervention as the U.S. intervention in Philippine or the British 
involvement in South Yemen and Oman, the examination started from the 
premise that during the first half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. government 
recognized Indian Territory as a separate country. The fact that the frontier was 
protected by border troops and people entering the Indian Territory needed 
special passes is sufficient to categorize the Indian territory as separate entities 
from the U.S.  
F. HYPOTHESIS  
New demands on forces responsible for maintaining the security of an 
environment frequently require that more troops perform policing and 
peacekeeping functions around the world. This can pose new challenges for the 
armed forces of a nation, especially when such functions become even more 
critical than participation in conventional confrontations. Paramount is the need to 
work in small teams, usually platoon or company level, with either our allies or 
local forces in an increasingly unconventional setting in which counterinsurgency 
may be, as Andrew Krepinevich (1986) wrote, “the most demanding contingency” 
(p. 274). The main hypotheses of this thesis is that language and cultural training 
can serve to enhance a military’s capability to extract relevant information in 
counter-insurgency efforts, thus leading to a more selective and effective use of 
force. Accordingly, the starting propositions are as follows:  
• Unconventional Warfare campaigns are protracted operations that 
require a deep understanding of the insurgent phenomenon and the 
strategic environments in which they operate (usually determined by 
conditions local to the insurgency) and such knowledge is best 
acquired prior to the deployment in the area of conflict.  
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• Intelligence gathering is vital during campaigns waged against 
unconventional combatants and cannot be acquired merely by 
technical means. Popular support is vital for success in UW. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
To accomplish the stated goals of this thesis a linear approach to the 
problem will be pursued. First, the notion of “operational environment” will be 
explained, followed by the presentation of selected existing models that are 
relevant for understanding unconventional warfare. Also included in this part will 
be an exploration of the role of language training and cultural awareness in UW. 
Second, four cases where U.S. and British armed forces were involved in small 
wars will be examined. In these cases, an investigation will be made to first 
determine how the British and Americans initially dealt with the insurgencies 
followed by how they eventually adapted to the operational environment.  These 
chapters will also examine whether people cooperate better through intimidation 
and the use of force, or if other methods are more likely to provide a greater 
chance of cooperation. Third, findings from the case studies will be used to 
determine the role of language training and cultural understanding on waging 
successful unconventional warfare. Finally, the conclusion will suggest some 
actions that should be taken by the Romanian military establishment to enhance 
its chances of producing desirable outcomes when it finds itself waging UW. 
H. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
The thesis will have five chapters. The first chapter gives a brief overview 
of current trends in the maintenance of national security, with an emphasis on 
how unconventional threats are being dealt with. Additionally, it points out the 
unconventional risks to Romania’s internal security (as identified by the NSS) 
and the transformation measures adopted by the Romanian Armed Forces over 
the last decade. Furthermore, it will present the methodological approach used in 
this thesis.  
The second chapter will explain the principles often associated with 
unconventional warfare, as well as assess their roles in conducting irregular 
operations. Subsequently, some current counterinsurgency models will be 
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examined. Additionally, the chapter will present the benefits of language training 
and cultural sensitivity in establishing the necessary trust within the foreign 
societies necessary to waging a successful counterinsurgency. 
The third chapter will analyze the U.S. armed forces’ involvement in small 
wars (i.e., like those wars described herein). This chapter will also examine the 
level of understanding of the operational environment necessary for the forces 
involved in counterinsurgencies to succeed. The level of violence used in 
carrying out these operations will also be discussed as well as what has been 
done to secure the loyalty of the local population. 
The fourth chapter will analyze the same problems as those presented in 
chapter three, but by examining recent British Armed Forces’ involvement in 
small wars. 
The fifth chapter will attempt to weigh the importance of cultural sensitivity 
and language proficiency in light of the inferences drawn from the above case 
studies. 
The sixth chapter will conclude the thesis by summarizing the main 
lessons that can prove profitable the Romanian Armed Forces when involved in 
unconventional warfare, based on a thorough examination of the role of language 
proficiency and cultural understanding. Additionally, it will offer proposals of how 
to improve the Romanian SOF’s ability to conduct unconventional missions in 


























II. UNDERSTANDING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort 
against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the 
product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his 
disposal and the strength of his will. 
Carl von Clausewitz4 
In the previous chapter it was proposed that the current threats to 
international security, with particular reference to the Romanian’s internal 
security have tended to move from conventional to unconventional spectrum. 
Furthermore, the main steps the Romanian defence establishment has 
undertaken in order to improve its efficiency were reviewed.  
This chapter will attempt to systematically examine the underlying 
principles of unconventional warfare. The main focus will be placed on 
understanding the strategic environment within which both guerrilla and 
antiguerrilla forces operate. Additionally, it will introduce some current theories of 
how counter-insurgencies tend to operate, as well as present some models of 
how nations currently approach irregular warfare. Finally, the chapter will present 
the benefits of cultural understanding and language training for operating in the 
current strategic environment. 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
Guerrilla warfare, revolutionary wars, underground resistance, subversion, 
sabotage and propaganda (to name just few forms of unconventional warfare) 
are far from being inventions of modern societies and can be traced back to 
ancient times. Unconventional tactics have been used throughout history in the 
context of military confrontations, from low to high intensity conflicts. Despite their 
different tags, they share some common underlying principles that help 
unconventional warfare emerge and grow, in the first place, and which makes 
them differ markedly from conventional confrontations.  
                                            
4 See Clausewitz, C. (1984). On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 77. 
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Whereas the typical Clausewitzian-based warfare strategy tends to place 
the center of gravity on the destruction of the opponent’s army in order to control 
a certain territory, unconventional warfare strategies often place a premium on 
co-opting local populations in order to achieve the same results. Traditionally, 
military operations have avoided mixing with civilians and sought separating 
them from the battlefield. However, this is not an option in irregular warfare 
because it takes place among the people. Unconventional warfare is not a small 
scale conventional confrontation and it is dangerous to treat it in this manner. 
Each insurgency is a unique occurrence which is influenced greatly by the local 
conditions of the place it arises. 
One of the first to acknowledge and describe guerrilla warfare was Antoine 
Jomini (1838) who, as he witness the French defeat in Spain, wrote, “the 
spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there 
be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the 
consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope 
never to see it” (p. 29). But, he described only one instance, i.e., when people 
have resorted to guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals, namely wars of national 
liberations. However, as James Rosenau5 (as cited in Tanter & Midlarsky, 1975, 
p. 49) argues, they are much more numerous and include a whole range of 
internal causes.  
Huntington (1962) distinguished three instances when groups resort to 
guerrilla warfare to accomplish their goals, “(1) after regular (i.e., stronger) forces 
have been defeated, (2) before they have been created, and (3) where they are 
unable to operate” (p. xvi). Their aim is twofold: On the political side, they aspire 
“to destroy the government’s prestige and authority” and rally people’s support; 
while, on the military side, they “aim to neutralize the government’s armed forces, 
and render them powerless to save the country” (Thompson, 1966, p. 29). In this 
milieu, insurgencies are unique occurrences during which, as Arthur Cebrowski 
                                            
5 Rosenau has identified three types of internal wars: caudillismo, authority war and structural 
war, but actually only the last two make use of the guerrilla tactics. Whether during authority wars 
insurgents compete to arrange and occupancy specific roles in the political structure, during 
structural wars, their goal is “the introduction of social and economic changes in the society”. 
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(2004) wrote “nations, states and others who wage wars, do so in ways 
appropriate to their culture and values” (p. 2). Therefore, in order to fight an 
insurgency, one has to understand the operational environment within which it 
takes place. This can be best represented by three aspects: political nature of an 
insurgency, physical environment (i.e. terrain features, climate, etc.) and human 
environment (with its language, cultural and traditional aspects). 
1. Political Nature of Insurgency  
Insurgencies are not random occurrences and they only take place when 
there is a state of dis-equilibrium at the societal level that has to be redressed. As 
Sorokin (1957) writes, they “are but logical and factual consequences of the state 
of disintegration of crystallized systems of relationships” (p. 535). However, in 
order to get started in the first place, insurgencies require a cause, as Antoine 
Jomini (1836) said more than a century ago: 
This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The 
serf may rise in a body at the call of the government, and their 
masters, affected by love of their sovereign and country, may set 
them the example and take the command of them; similarly, a 
fanatical people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a 
people enthusiastic in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred 
love of its institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all 
it holds most dear (p. 30). 
Such causes may not be evident upon first glance, as “there is always 
some issue which has an appeal to each section of the community, and, even if 
dormant, an inspired incident may easily revive it in an acute form” (Thompson, 
1966, p. 21). It is up to the insurgents to make them “appear legitimate, 
progressive and desirable”, and anti-colonialism, land for landless, regional 
autonomy and political equality for the minorities have been a few of the most 
common ideas used by communists to mobilize people to their side (p. 21).  
In essence, insurgencies are protracted political movements that try to 
accomplish goals by rallying people’s support around an idea. The 
unconventional character of certain guerrilla actions does not rest on the 
capability of insurgents to fight their opponent through elaborate military 
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strategies. Rather, they rely on their relative anonymity to erode their opponent’s 
influence from the periphery, through the use of subversion, deception and, at 
the last resort by military actions. As Robert Thompson (1966) writes, “Opening 
the armed struggle is a measure both of success and of the failure of subversion. 
The subversion has been successful enough for them to mount an insurgency, 
but not successful enough to win by subversion” (p. 28).  
Unlike in conventional wars, where one might take control over a body of 
people following a crushing defeat of their army, guerrilla actions have to be 
understood by taking a political perspective, often involving long-standing 
problems. There is no well-defined period of time for an insurgency to grow, 
witnessed by the fact that the guerrilla phase may go on for years before 
reaching its zenith of power. The highly secretive nature of guerrilla warfare 
allows insurgents to operate below the military horizon and to keep a relatively 
low profile in relation with counter-insurgent forces. During this time, rebels seek 
both to expand their control over the population through façade organizations 
which tend to rely on propaganda, rather than purely through the use of military 
force. Unless government forces (i.e., the military establishment and 
constabulary forces) are properly equipped, trained and organized to fight 
guerrillas, they will merely react to the insurgents’ actions, often with 
overwhelming force against the civilian population, thereby creating more 
discontent. 
The erosion of state authority usually starts in the countryside, where 
governmental control is weak, gradually extending to the cities. During this 
process, insurgents barely hold any territory, instead funneling all of their efforts 
into rallying the local people through propaganda and political means to create as 
Thompson (1966) says, three types of recruits: “(1) the natural, (2) the converted 
and (3) the deceived” (p. 35). Pondering this subject, Mao Tse-Tung (as cited in 
Shaw, 1975) wrote, 
It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to see why the war 
must be fought and how it concerns him… By word of mouth, by 
leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, 
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through plays and films, through schools, through the mass 
organizations and through our cadres…We must link the political 
mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the 
life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous 
movement. (p. 224). 
The reason behind the insurgents’ strategy of gradually attaining their 
ends can be found in their perceived weaknesses in relation to the state in which 
they live. Whereas states are “forces in being” and have specially designated 
institutions (e.g., security forces, courts of law, etc.) to handle the problems of 
society, the insurgents are merely “forces in development,” usually without any 
legal status. Thus, an insurgency is typically no match for a state’s security 
apparatus (McCormick, 2003). 
2. Natural Environment 
Understanding the natural environment is important during unconventional 
warfare campaigns because the contours of the terrain often dictate the way both 
governmental and guerrilla forces will conduct their operations. Still, as Ney 
(1962) asserted, the environment “should not be conceived of merely in 
geographical terms, however significant these may be. Environment also 
embraces climate, terrain, the road and communication networks, local economic 
conditions, the location of villages and towns” (p. 28).  
Whereas geographical barriers exert a direct influence on guerrilla 
warfare, the climate and local conditions often affect it indirectly. Mountains, 
jungles and deserts not only tend to restrict the ability of governmental forces to 
deploy troops, it can also nullify their technological superiority. Such conditions 
may also greatly influence the development and cohesiveness of indigenous 
communities. 
Guerrillas are very sensitive to the natural environment within which they 
operate because it may dictate the way their attacks are conducted against 
governmental forces. In this regard, Jomini (1838) writes: “The nature of the 
country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a national defense. In 
mountainous countries people are always most formidable; next to these are 
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countries covered with extensive forests” (p. 30). Restrictive terrain may allow a 
relatively lightly-equipped insurgent force not only to stay on the offensive against 
governmental troops, but also enhances its use of hit and run tactics. Insurgent 
forces often favor using ambush tactics along main routes of travel, or places 
where terrain does not permit conventional forces to use their superior firepower. 
Insurgents fighting on land in their natural environment often have a 
double advantage over their enemy, in that they are (1) better adapted to the 
local conditions, thereby easing their efforts, and (2) usually have an intimate 
knowledge of the terrain. Pondering this last factor, Callwell (1996) writes, “he 
knows the tracks over the hills, the path through the jungle, the passages over 
the rivers, the points where he can be sure of replenishing his few requirements” 
(p. 53). Furthermore, “(an insurgent) finds everywhere a relative or a friend who 
aids him; the commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the 
slightest movement on the part of invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat 
his projects” (Jomini, 1838, p. 31).  
3. Human Environment 
Human environment embraces two distinctive set of factors: “ethnicity” 
and “the system of religious belief” (Ney, 1962, p. 28). Whereas the first is the 
sum of language, traditions and customs and may shape the attitudes of 
indigenous population towards both the guerrilla and the counter-insurgent force, 
the second “may determine how a people will behave under the condition of 
guerrilla warfare” (p. 28). 
As T.E Lawrence (as cited in Leites and Wolf, 1970) noted, the success of 
an insurgency often rests on “a population … sympathetic to the point of not 
betraying rebel movement to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two percent 
active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic” (p. 11). 
Recounting the importance of a friendly population toward the guerrillas during 
the partisan war in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, Franklin Lindsay6 
(1993) wrote, “Their support was crucial to success. They provided the 
                                            
6 Franklin Lindsay is a former OSS officer who during the Second World War served as a 
liaison officer for the Allied command in Italy with Tito’s Partisans in Slovenia. 
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intelligence screens that surrounded and protected the armed Partisans, as well 
as the food and clothing, the shelter and the recruits, without which the Partisans 
could not survive” (p. 198).  
Due to non-territorial characteristic of insurgencies corroborated with 
insurgents’ high degree of mobility, as Leites & Wolf (1970) say, “information is 
more important in insurgency and counter-insurgency than in other forms of 
conflict” (p. 137). According to Thompson (1966) “good intelligence leads to more 
frequent and more rapid contacts. More contacts lead to more kills, this in turn 
leads to greater confidence in the population, resulting in better intelligence and 
still more contacts and kills” (p. 89). However, as Handel (1992) writes,  
The danger is that modern intelligence analysts and commanders 
may focus on what can be measured rather than on the most 
important but more illusive factors of will. Certainly one important 
lesson of the Gulf War is that a close examination of enemy’s will 
(which requires familiarity with his language, culture and politics) 
should always be carried out (p. 17-18). 
B. BREAKING IRREGULAR WARFARE’S DYNAMICS? 
Unconventional warfare, with its multi-dimensional character, has always 
set a variety of demands on those who have attempted to design a coherent 
strategy to fight guerrillas. The difficulty can be seen by recognizing the fact that 
every country presents unique challenges to conventional forces, challenges 
impossible to replicate in other places, thus making every insurgency a peculiar 
case.  
For example, Che Guevara’s failure to export the Cuban model of 
revolution to the Congo or Bolivia can largely be attributed to the many 
differences between Cuba and the other nations. Accordingly, it would be a 
mistake to believe that there is only one successful counter-insurgency model, 
which can be used in all situations. Instead, one must be able to understand both 
internal dynamics and the nature of irregular warfare in order to tailor an 
appropriate response to a particular insurgency. However, this does not diminish 
the benefit of studying existing models, as they may provide useful guidelines. 
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Consequently, some current counter-insurgency theories will be examined in the 
following sections.  
The first theory to be looked at stresses the need to win “the hearts and 
minds of the people,” and has been promoted by such famous counter-insurgent 
theorists as Sir Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, Peter Paret, Larry Cable and 
Andrew Krepinevich to name just a few of the most prominent. It underscores the 
political and psychological dimensions of the insurgency/counter-insurgency 
campaign which can be viewed as a battle to control people, rather than simply 
to control land. Perhaps the most important thing for a government to do in these 
situations is to maintain a positive attitude, trying to keep its objective political 
rather than military. This realization may start a government on a reform 
program.  
In a counter-insurgency, the role of the armed forces is often to separate 
guerrillas from their base of support, and to protect people from the guerrilla’s 
vengeance. During the Hukbalahaps insurgency, President Magsaysay gave 
special prominence to the re-indoctrination program of the Philippine Army. He 
was aware that the army was the most visible symbol of the government in the 
countryside and that “the government would be judged by the stance and actions 
of the soldiery in relation to the rural population” (Stilwell, 1989, p. 302).  
A similar program was set up in El Salvador under the supervision of the 
US military advisors. The main ideas inculcated in this program stressed that the 
Salvadorian Army’s mission was: (1) to protect citizens, (2) to fight guerrilla and 
(3) to contribute to the moral development and welfare of the civilian population. 
Some have said that it is better to counteract guerrilla’s strategy of sowing ‘fear 
and hate’ with a sustained campaign of regaining legitimacy (Kaldor, p. 114).  
Sir Robert Thompson (1968) suggested five principles that should guide 
governmental actions aimed at preventing the growth of an insurgent 
organization.  
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• the government must have a clear political aim: to establish and 
maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and 
economically stable and viable 
• the government must function in accordance with law 
• the government must have an overall plan  
• the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, 
not the guerrillas 
• in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its 
base area first (p. 51-57) 
The second theory points out the prevalence of political, social, and 
economic aspects in the internal dynamic of an insurgency (Leites & Wolf, 1970, 
p. 6). It approaches insurgency “as a system and an organizational technique, 
and views the process of countering a rebellion in terms of weakening its 
organization while strengthening the structure of authority” (p. 4). The starting 
premise for Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. (1970) was that insurgencies 
require steady fluxes of resources: recruits, food, financial resources, etc, which 
can come from both internal (endogeny) and external (exogeny) environment (p. 
32). Within the organization they are converted into outputs by the use of internal 
mechanisms. The output can take the form of terrorist acts, demonstrations, 
attacks against security forces, etc.  
Consequently, any counter-insurgency effort should have as its aim to 
disrupt this flow, and thereby to complicate insurgents’ logistical systems to the 
point they are unable to repeat the cycle. The aim of this “input denial” measure 
is to prevent any kind of supplies from getting to guerrillas, thus causing them to 
spend more of their time fulfilling their immediate needs, rather than to planning 
and conducting operations. Stopping smuggling from neighboring countries may 
be essential, but it should be augmented with internal measures to control the 
society that may facilitate the smuggling. 
During the Malayan emergency, food was distributed to the population 
already cooked, and cans were punctured, all in an effort to prevent Communist 
guerrilla from storing it. Furthermore, security forces can prevent guerrillas from 
moving freely within the populated areas and spreading their propaganda by 
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strictly controlling the population’s movement. This might be done through the 
imposition of a curfew or through issuing new identification papers. Thus, 
according to Leites & Wolf, it is a matter of raising the costs to the level where 
insurgents are unable to restart the cycle again.  
 
Figure 1.   Insurgency as a system (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 35) 
C. THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURAL SENSITIVITY AND LANGUAGE 
TRAINING DURING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Local population represents the most important element in the 
unconventional warfare domain. It is also the only component that can be 
influenced through a wide range of actions; actions ranging from non-violent 
ones (e.g., the distribution of propaganda) to extremely brutal ones (e.g., 
terrorism, political assassinations, etc). However, persuasion plays a very 
important role, the success of which rests on the ability of people to communicate 
and generate trust. This process is facilitated through the use of language. In a 
cultural context, language influences the way people think, communicate and 
behave. Thus, as Leavitt (as cited in Force,1961) says, language does not only 
serve “as a device for reporting human experience but also as a way of defining, 
analyzing, and organizing it trough prescribed channels into meaningful 
categories for its speakers” (p. 1202). Languages often act as very complex 
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guides to the social reality in which human communities operate. Learning a 
foreign language not only gives one a useful tool to interrelate with others in a 
foreign culture, but may also help one understand and appreciate “what in the 
foreign culture converges with ours in consolidating a basic human value” 
(Balakian, 1961, p. 254).  
Equally important to communicate different attitudes during human 
interactions is the use of non-verbal communication (i.e., facial expression, body 
posture, gesture, proximity). Non-verbal messages are an essential component 
of communication but not sufficient in creating trust and influence. Usually they 
are transmitted both voluntary and involuntary thus making their interpretation 
more difficult outside the cultural context. While interrelating with other people, 
individuals tend to relate everything to their own system of judging behavior, 
which they may regard as universal, thus generating many problems for 
outsiders. Richard McGonigal (1971) identified some relevant concepts that can 
be communicated from a person’s unintended actions or attitudes, e.g., 
condescension, contempt, entropy, goal dissonance, heterophily, kinetics, noise, 
patronization, proxemics” (McGonigal, 1971p. 8). These tend to affect all human 
interactions. This is especially true when foreign troops are deployed into the 
conflict area, deployments that almost always entail close contact with the 
population.  
Recounting the negative effects of a person’s lack of cultural sensitivity, 
Roger Hilsman writes (as cited in Malcom, 1996), “if we violated the mores of any 
particular group, that group would turn on us” (p. 39). 
Thus, it is important to understand that culture is often a relative matter, 
and its evaluation cannot be done outside the environment that generates it 
(Hoopes & Pusch, 1979, p. 3). According to Hoopes & Pusch (1979): 
Culture is the sum total of way of living; including vales, beliefs 
esthetic standards, linguistic expressions, patterns of thinking, 
behavioral norms, and styles of communication which a group of 
people has developed to assure its survival in a particular physical 
and human environment. Culture, and people who are part if it, 
interact, so that culture is not static. Culture is the response of a 
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group of human beings to the valid and particular needs of its 
members (p. 3). 
Although it has long been recognized that culture shock can be a serious 
issue because it can severely hamper a person’s ability to perform efficiently, it 
has been neglected by military establishments. Describing the benefits of 
receiving language and cultural training, James Bruton and Wayne Zajac (1988) 
state that military personnel assigned to a tour of duty in Vietnam, after being 
trained in these fields, performed far better than those who didn’t receive such 
training. According to Bruton and Zajac, cultural sensitivity and language skills 
contributed “significantly to positive cultural interaction with the Vietnamese 
people” (p. 30). A good command of a language puts individuals in a better 
position to deal with the behavior patterns of other people (Balakian, 1961, p. 
253)  
The benefits of cross-cultural training have also been pointed out by 
Richard McGonigal, who identified that they produce a twofold benefit: (1) It 
makes one aware of how he is perceived by his counterparts and (2) increases 
one’s tolerance for ambiguity (McGonigal, 1971, p. 1). Cross-cultural training 
refers to “all kinds of programs that train people to live, work, study or perform 
effectively in a cultural setting different from their own. The techniques of cross-
cultural training are normally experiential, though they may include comparative 
cultural studies or the study of specific cultures” (Hoopes & Pusch, 1979, p. 7). 
D. CONCLUSIONS  
The unique character of unconventional warfare comes largely from the 
fact that they are usually struggles for the minds and hearts of people, rather 
than for territories. Fostering legitimacy during insurgencies is more important, 
perhaps, than is the use of firepower. Thus, any strategy to conduct irregular 
warfare operations should be based on gaining local support. This requires 
people to have a deep understanding of their counterparts; a knowledge that can 
best be obtained through specific training that emphasizes not only language, but 
also cultural understanding.  
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III. U.S. ARMY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS 
The art of war is important to the state. It is a matter of life and 
death, a road either to safety or ruin. Hence, under no 
circumstances can it be neglected.  
Sun Tzu 
The previous chapter examined insurgency and counterinsurgency from 
theoretical points of view, focusing primarily on the main principles utilized by 
each side in small wars. The present chapter will examine two instances of U.S. 
involvement in small wars.  
Within the context of both its wars against Native Americans (henceforth, 
called the “Indian Wars”) and the Philippine insurgency of 1899 against 
Aguinaldo’s guerrillas, an examination will ensue of the level of understanding of 
the operational environment exhibited by U.S. forces, the level of violence used 
to achieve U.S. purposes, and last but not least, how the U.S. troops secured the 
cooperation of the local peoples. 
A. INDIAN WARS 
Following the establishment of the American Republic and the War of 
1812, the U.S. government pursued a steady policy to undermine the military 
power of the eastern Native American tribes, especially those fighting alongside 
the British Army. Until the Mexican War this effort aimed to resettle Native 
American tribes peacefully, west of Mississippi River. Furthermore, efforts were 
then made to establish an Indian nation. Hence, the office of Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs within the War Department was created in 1832. Two years later, 
the Indian Intercourse Act (designed to help settle the legal problems of entering 
the Indian Country) was passed, and from that moment the border “amounted 
almost to an international frontier (Weigley, 1973, p. 154). This seemingly stable 
situation was to be altered by the discovery of gold in California. As increasing 
numbers of prospectors and settlers crossed through Indian lands as they were 
heading west, the number of conflicts between the “white man” and the natives 
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increased, thus prompting the U.S. government to dispatch the army. New forts 
were erected and more soldiers were brought in to guard routes and provide 
protection to the settlers. Initially intended only as a stop-gap, policing measure 
to end lawlessness in the Indian territories, it gradually degenerated into fierce 
fighting between parties. This grew to be especially intense following the Civil 
War. The U.S. government’s fledgling army was often little prepared for such 
conflicts because, unlike their previous confrontations (where enemies had been 
clearly defined and the warfare usually took place in open spaces, between large 
bodies of troops), this time their opponents often proved to be masters of 
guerrilla-warfare tactics.  
Despite its name, the Indian Wars were merely a collection of small 
campaigns, during which Native Americans continually harassed the nineteenth 
century Napoleonic Army of the United States in its quest for a decisive battle. 
The Sioux War, the Modoc War (1872-1873), the Red River War (1874-1875) 
and the Battle of Little Bighorn (1876) are among the most important campaigns, 
but neither one succeeded in undermining Indians’ will to fight. As a result, the 
U.S. Army patrolling the Indian territories had to be constantly “on the watch 
against hostile perfidy” of the native Indians, as Callwell (1996, p. 50) noted.  
1. Understanding the Operational Environment 
a. Political Nature of Insurgency 
 Though it created an agency whose sole function was to deal with 
the Indian problem (i.e., the Department of Indian Affairs), the U.S. government 
pursued what is now recognized to have been an inconsistent policy toward 
native populations. For example, whenever signs indicated that reservation land 
was valuable for either mining or the purposes of agriculture prior settling 
agreements were frequently broken. The result was that Indians were often 
excluded from their own territory, relegated to “lands where the white man was 
not yet ready to adventure, or where it was assumed he would never settle” 
(Weigley, 1973, p. 153). This constant expansion of the white man vastly 
impaired the notion of the Indian Country.  
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 Things became worse when the Indians were threatened by 
starvation--due to the loss of their traditional sources of food; their fighting often 
became more fierce. According to Crook, “ninety-nine-hundredths” of the troubles 
were created by Indian agents who were supposed to care about the Indians’ 
welfare: 
The Interior Department did little that was calculated to induce an 
era of peace and prosperity among the Apaches. Instead, a policy 
of removal was carried into effect. The Indians were gradually 
forced to leave the reservations which had been assured them, and 
obliged to move to the hot, dry flats of the San Carlos (as cited in 
Schmitt, 1946, p. 241). 
 Under the Department of the Interior, the government did little to 
identify the real causes of Indian rebellion often concluding that the army’s 
assistance was required simply to return the Indian parties who had “illegally” left 
their reservation. When Army officers addressed the Indian Bureau for a 
clarification of who the enemy was, instead of a plain answer they were told by 
the state officials that, “those on the reservation were friendly and the exclusive 
responsibility of the Indian Bureau” while “those off the reservation were hostile 
and the responsibility of the army” (Utley, 1984, p. 165). However, as noted by 
Utley (1984), this was not necessarily true “Indians off the reservation were not 
necessarily belligerent. They might be out hunting, or headed for a visit with 
friends in another tribe, or simply wandering about seeing the country” while 
those inside were not necessarily friendly (p. 165).  
 As Indian territory was occupied by the white man, the federal 
policy toward Native Indians changed to one of assimilation. According to 
Weigley (1973), the general opinion at the time was that “if the Indians were to 
live close to the white man, they must abandon their own way of life and take up 
the white man’s” (p. 156). However, the practice demonstrated that the US 
officials discriminated between the white man and the native Indians on the 
subject of legal matters. While the whites were seldom punished for their 
wrongdoings against the natives, there were frequently “posses” (i.e., people in 
hot pursuit) that came together to bring the Indian perpetrators of wrongdoing to 
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“justice”. Describing this situation, General Crook wrote, “It was of no unfrequent 
occurrence for an Indian to be shot down in cold blood, or a squaw to be raped 
by some brute. Such a thing as a white man being punished for outraging an 
Indian was unheard of” (as cited in Schmitt, 1946, p. 16).  
b. Natural Environment 
 The rugged terrain where the rebel Indians chose to hide enhanced 
the efficiency of their hit and run tactics. Indians’ superior knowledge of the 
territory allowed them to move unseen by their opponents. Only gradually did the 
army overcome this disadvantage, through intensive exploration and mapping as 
the campaigns wore on. Eventually, the use of Indian scouts proved very 
important in overcoming this difficulty. Therefore, the success of army operations 
rested upon the accuracy of its intelligence, coupled with its own mobility. 
Acknowledging this phenomenon, Schuyler writes, “the campaigns in Arizona did 
not owe their ultimate success to any particular Waterloo-like victory, as much as 
they did to the covering of a great deal of ground by a comparatively small 
number of men, permitting the Indians no rest and rendering any and every 
hiding place insecure” (as cited in Utley, 1984, p. 157). In achieving similar goals, 
General Crook organized his troops in mixed parties of white soldiers and Indian 
scouts, supported with mule trains for the transportation of supplies and men, 
reasoning, “a mule train can go anywhere; there is no rear to protect at the cost 
of largely reducing your fighting force” (as cited in Schmitt, 1946, p. 213). 
c. Human Environment 
  Inhabiting a very large area native Indians did not represent a 
homogenous society and people gave their allegiance to the family and tribe 
rather than the race. As Utley (1973) noted, “Culturally, the tribes differed 
markedly from one another. They spoke different languages, were organized 
according to different political and social forms, and worshiped different deities” 
(p. 5). However, from the point of view of military culture and organization, 
Indians shared some common characteristics as they fought “principally for the 
honors of war, both individual and group” (p. 6). 
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  The prevailing misunderstanding of the real motives that made 
Indians leave the reservations prompted, in most of the cases, a military 
response. As Utley notes, the army’s poor performances in the early phases of 
the campaign were often due to the fact that it “did not pursue its Indian-fighting 
mission very creatively” (Utley, 1984, p. 166). While the army was sending 
“heavy columns of infantry and cavalry, locked to slow moving supply trains” in 
search of Indians, the latter could scatter and vanish almost instantly (p. 167). 
This was possible because of the significant dissimilarities in the tactics used and 
the different approach toward the fight. While the U.S. army focused on how 
usher in a decisive type of battles; ones like the battles that had ended the Civil 
War, the protesting Indian tribes were unwilling subjects. Instead, the Indians 
relied on small war parties, conducting small skirmishes using hit and run tactics. 
Describing this situation, Asprey (1994) quipped, “Small in number, these bands 
moved fast, struck hard, and disappeared. Little pattern existed in either their 
strategy or their tactics” (p. 111). The few exceptions when the Indians stayed 
and fought proved to be an exercise in deadly futility. The superior organization 
and discipline of the U.S. army had always prevailed over the native Indians’ 
individual qualities. This individual character of Indian tribal society inhibited the 
rise of powerful leader able to bring tribes together. As Utley (1984) wrote,  
Despite the common danger, tribal particularism and intertribal 
animosities remained as strong as ever. Sometimes tribes came 
together in alliances against visible threats from whites, but rarely 
did such alliance hang together for long. Even unity within a tribe 
proved illusion (p. 169). 
 Furthermore, due to the great mobility of Native American warriors, 
they were able to engage in fighting far away from their base camps, thus 
keeping them safe from any retaliation. They often “traveled huge distances in a 
few hours after one of their devastating forays” (Callwell, 1996, p. 52).  
 Significant in this regard is Kiowa‘s raid during the summer of 1872 
into Texas when a party of  ten men led by Pogo-to-goodle left Fort Still 
Reservation heading south into a sparse populated territory. During the travel 
they “come upon a lone white soldier, afoot, lost and near death from thirst” 
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whom they killed and scalped (p. 162). Once after completing their mission they 
were on their way home when they saw a column of soldiers. Following a brief 
engagement they killed one, whom they looted and scalped, after, which they 
“crossed the Red River into their reservation sanctuary” (p. 164). And, this is only 
one account of a ”raid by a small party intent on plunder, coups, scalps and 
sometimes revenge” Indians carried out during the confrontation that lasted more 
than a hundred years (p. 161). 
2. Use of Force 
The army’s inability to deal with the irregular tactics of the Indians 
prompted them to carry out brutal reprisals against entire tribes. According to 
Utley (1984), the army “never learned to discriminate between the guilty and the 
innocent simply because rarely was a group of Indians unmistakably one or the 
other” (p. 166). Hence, because of the unconventional nature of the warfare, the 
army’s pursuit of victory often led to a total war against entire Indian populations, 
and those Indians who decided to stay and fight often died. Words ascribed to 
U.S. Colonel Gillem are illustrative of this point: “I have dislodged the Modocs 
from the Stronghold in the Lava Beds. They are moving southward. No effort will 
be spared to exterminate them” (as cited in Quinn, 1998, p. 147). When it was 
understood that Indians were vulnerable in their winter camps, Army leaders 
made extensive use of their ability to conduct military campaigns the year around 
to “kill (Indians) or drive them from their lodges, to destroy their ponies, food, and 
shelter, and to hound them mercilessly across a frigid landscape until they gave 
up” (Utley, 1984, p. 169). Examples of this phenomenon include the battles won 
by George Custer at Washita, and of George Crook and Nelson Miles who 
defeated Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse (Asprey, 1994, p. 113).  
As the number of settlers in Indian territories increased, the use of force 
was no longer the exclusive domain of the U.S. army. People often organized 
themselves in “colonial and state militia, territorial and national volunteers, 
rangers, ‘minute companies’, spontaneously formed home guards” to supplement 
the regular troops, but their actions were not always purely defensive, aimed to 
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defend their properties (Utley, 1978, p. 6). There were instances when they 
carried out their own vendettas against the Indian tribes which frequently led to 
killings of innocent tribesmen. Instead of such vigilantes being punished, they 
were often regarded as heroes or rewarded. Significant in this account is the 
case of Ben Wright who killed in cold blood a Modoc party he invited to his 
headquarter “under the flag of truce” (Quinn, 1998, p. 12). This, in turn, led to a 
long range of bloody feuds, whose victims were often whites and native Indians, 
alike.  
3. Securing People’s Loyalty 
One of the few individuals who fully understood the Indians and their 
grievances was General Crook. His superior understanding of the problem was 
enhanced by two things: 1) his commitment and 2) his openness to learn about 
his opponents. As Schmitt (1946) writes, “First, he (General Crook) made the 
frontier his life work and his life hobby, not simply an interval in a carrier pointed 
toward Governor’s Island or Washington, D.C. Second, he approached the 
problem of the frontier, the Indians, not only as a ‘pacifier’, a representative of 
force, but as a humanitarian and an interested student of his job” (p. xiv). Having 
spent more than twenty-six years observing Indian behavior, he put much effort 
into becoming intimately acquainted with Indian practices. His efforts were 
greatly enhanced by the fact that he was able to speak certain Indian dialects. 
His ability to communicate freely with Indians allowed him, not only to understand 
their grievances, but also to curry favor when negotiating with them. 
A good example of his accomplishments was the surrender of Chiricahuas 
tribesmen, to U.S. governmental forces only eight months after Crook resumed 
command of the Department of Arizona. General Crook had established a good 
reputation as a result of his previous successful operation methods. General 
Crook was perceived not only a tough military commander, but also as a man of 
honor   whose  “promise  was good”  (Schmitt,  1946,  p. 243).  Therefore,  when  
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negotiating with the Chiricahuas leaders (i.e., Geronimo, Chato, Bonito, etc.) his 
personal involvement was enough to make them give up hostilities and return to 
San Carlos (p. 246-249).  
4. Conclusions  
The army’s ability to successfully engage Indians in combat increased 
gradually after the employment of the Indian scouts as an auxiliary to its regular 
forces. According to Utley (1978), they were able to “differentiate between guilty 
and innocent and, using the Indian’s own fighting style, contend with the guilty” 
(p.10). However, because such use of an auxiliary didn’t fit the Army’s vision of 
how to conduct military operations it was never adopted on a broad scale. Thus 
“no military school or training program, no tactics manual, and very little 
professional literature provided guidance on how to fight or treat Indians” (Utley, 
1978, p. 8). The only instruction West Point cadets were receiving at the time 
was provided by Denis Hart Mahan who included brief discussions about Indian-
fighting tactics in one of his courses (p. 8). Pondering the long term effect over 
the army in these campaigns, Utley (1978) summarized as follows: “(The) army’s 
frontier employment unfitted it for orthodox war at the same time that its 
preoccupation with orthodox war unfitted it for its frontier missions” (p. 7). The 
failure of the Army leaders of the time to recognize the type of war they were 
waging prevented it from winning with ease--instead, it was Indian disunity that 
resulted in their own defeat.  
B. PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY  
The Philippine archipelago encompasses thousand of islands stretched 
over an area of 116,000 square miles. They had been under Spanish rule for 
more than 300 years. By April 30, 1898 when U.S. President George McKinley 
ordered Commodore George Dewey to move his vessels against the Spanish 
fleet in Manila Bay, the Spanish were facing a rebellion that broke in 1896 in 
Luzon (Welch, 1979, p. 4). The insurgency, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, was 
organized  by  a  secret society called the “Katipunan”, a group which had a large  
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support-base on the main islands among the Tagalog tribes (Joes, 1996, p. 48). 
By late spring 1898, the number of insurgents was nearly thirty thousand (Asprey 
1994, p. 123). 
The dispute between the U.S. forces and Aguinaldo’s followers started on 
August 13, 1898 when Spanish garrison defending Manila surrendered the city to 
American troops after a symbolic resistance. The peace with the Spanish was 
negotiated by Commodore George Dewey and Major General Wesley Merritt 
who excluded the Filipinos’ from the talks. Moreover, at the surrender ceremony 
American troops, marched into the city “unaccompanied by their Filipino allies” 
(Welch, 1979, p. 5). This prearranged surrender of Manila to the American 
forces, and the subsequent exclusion of Aguinaldo and his followers from 
governance, raised a pronounced sense of bitterness among the Filipino 
insurgents. Moreover, President McKinley refused to recognize both the Visayan 
Republic and the Filipino’s right to govern themselves. Instead, in his December 
21, 1898 proclamation President McKinley declared that the U.S. policy toward 
the Filipinos will be one of “benevolent assimilation”. To insure the successful 
implementation of his plan, he ordered an increase in the military presence to 
30,000 soldiers, of whom “more than half were state volunteers” (Boot, 2002, p. 
109). By November 1899, this contingency was completely replaced by a 35,000 
volunteer force (Boot, 2002, p. 110). 
The situation between the two parties became irreconcilable after General 
Otis, Merritt’s successor as commander of American forces in Manila, launched 
an unsuccessful campaign to capture Aguinaldo (who, at the time, was pursuing 
a conventional-style campaign to drive American forces out of Manila). Upon 
realizing the futility of his conventional tactics, Aguinaldo and his followers 
decided to adopt guerrilla tactics in his conflict with the U.S. As a first step, he 
withdrew his force into the mountains of northern Luzon (Boot, 2002, p. 110). The 
Paris treaty signed on December 10, 1898 that sanctioned American sovereignty 
throughout the Philippine was the last straw, making war inevitable. 
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1. Understanding the Operational Environment 
a. Political Nature of Insurgency  
 Far from being “part of any grand scheme to promote the economic 
or strategic interests of America in the Far East”, President McKinley’s intentions 
to acquire the Philippines was based initially on his desire to impair the Spanish 
ability to wage war. However, his decision to stay and assume a leading role in 
the archipelago’s political life was based on a report sent to him by an appointed 
commission headed by Jacob Schurman. In the report Schurman said, 
…(The) lack of [Filipino] education and political experience, 
combined with their racial and linguistic diversity, disqualify them, in 
spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues, to undertake the 
task of governing the archipelago at the present time. The most that 
can be expected of them is to cooperate with the Americans in the 
administration of general affairs … and to undertake, subject to 
American control or guidance (as may be found necessary), the 
administration of provincial and municipal affairs… 
Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission 
believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse 
into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the 
intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands 
among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the 
idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippines 
Commonwealth at all conceivable (as cited in Asprey, 1994, p. 
125). 
 Consequently, McKinley “found it difficult to conceive that this little 
brown man could object to the authority and good intentions of the American 
friends” (Welch, 1979, p.5). What he failed to notice, however, was that his policy 
toward the native population, no matter how enlightened, was viewed by the 
Filipinos as an attempt to change one imperial power with another. It gave 
Aguinaldo and his followers a new way to appeal to the population. The main 
themes were independence and self-determination. As Joes (1996) asserted, 
Aguinaldo’s agitation implied “that the Americans had come to enslave the 
Filipinos and destroy Catholicism” (p. 49). Therefore, as the number of the U.S. 
troops increased, and Aguinaldo’s protests continued to be dismissed by top 
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American officials, the “natives ill feeling began to leave the Spanish corpse to 
quiver about the newcomer” (Asprey, 1994, p. 126).  
 Acting on the information available about Aguinaldo, America’s 
military leaders concluded that he was not very popular amongst the people, 
especially among non-Tagalogs. Thus, they constantly displayed condescension 
and contempt toward him and his troops, whom the U.S. perceived as “more of a 
mob than a military force” (Dupuy & Baumer, 1968, p. 67). As a result, U.S. 
commanders constantly rejected Filipinos’ involvement and avoided any 
reference to being co-laborers with them. Filipinos were refused even a role in 
the surrender ceremony, although they made a major contribution in defeating 
the Spanish. As Welch (1979) noted, American leaders thought that “the U.S. 
Army could operate more efficiently if it were not forced to share its authority with 
the ragtail soldiers of Emilio Aguinaldo” (p. 5).  
 The Philippine conflict that started on February 4, 1899 found the 
U.S. Army a little better prepared than they were during Spanish-American war. 
The army incorporated some of their previous experiences from the Caribbean 
and Central America which resulted in changes, in weapons and tactics. 
However, there was still a lack of understanding at the strategic command level 
regarding the meaning of guerrilla warfare and other non-conventional aspects. 
The fact that Aguinaldo’s forces were driven underground and defeated around 
Manila in a conventional manner, apparently led General Otis to conclude that he 
won this war, too, causing him to say: 
You asked me to say when the war in the Philippines will be over…. 
The war in Philippines is already over …all we have to do is protect 
Filipinos against themselves…. There will be no more real fighting 
… little skirmishes which amount to nothing (as cited in Asprey, 
1994, p. 129). 
b. Natural Environment 
 Due to uniqueness of the geographical environment, American 
troops faced several problems in the Philippine insurgency, among them being a 
lack of suitable uniforms and food rations. Soldiers were issued flannel uniforms 
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which were too thick for the humid tropical environment in which they had to 
operate. Also, the canned food provisions could not be maintained properly and, 
thus, frequently spoiled (Boot, 2002, 108). In addition, the tropical diseases 
during the rainy season were virulent, often depleting up to 60 percent of a unit’s 
strength (p. 109). As the campaign progressed, troops were able to surmount 
these problems. The conflict finally ended when General Frederick Funston, 
based on good information and astute use of the Macabebe scouts, was able to 
mount a hoax that resulted in Aguinaldo’s capture, thus landing a fatal blow to 
the insurgency.  
c. Human Environment 
 As a whole, the results of the campaign improved when General 
Otis was replaced by General Arthur MacArthur, a veteran of the Civil and Indian 
Wars. He completely changed the approach toward the Filipinos. Instead of 
trying to subdue them by force, MacArthur set about working with the 
constabulary force. He employed techniques aimed at pacifying them developed 
by the U.S. forces in the Caribbean (Bundt, 2004, p.9). MacArthur recruited 
soldiers and scouts from the Macabebes, Illocanos, and other Philippine ethnic 
groups--groups who were “suspicious of the Tagalogs”—in order to enhance the 
capabilities of U.S. troops (Boot, 2002, p. 114). Moreover, important help was 
provided by William Howard Taft, the chairman of the commission that 
supervised the transition from military to civilian rule in pacified areas. Despite 
their disagreements, MacArthur and Taft were able to complement each other’s 
actions. While MacArthur, through the use of well-tailored military power, denied 
the insurgent forces sanctuaries in which to hide, Taft was winning the hearts 
and minds of the people through social programs. Though greatly outnumbered 
throughout the campaign by a margin of almost three to one, the U.S. won 
because they were able to make a better use of “‘chastisement’ and ‘attraction’” 
(Boot, 2002, p. 126). According to Boot (2002) “there were an average of only 
24,000 US soldiers in the field at any given time to face at least 80,000 
insurgents” (p. 126). 
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 Unlike the previous case (which almost led to the extinction of an 
entire nation), U.S. involvement in the Philippine insurgency is a success story in 
which, as Joes (1996) aptly states, “all sides were able to live with each other 
and with themselves” (p. 47). The distinct character that differentiated the 
Philippines case from previous ones, causing analysts to consider it one of the 
preeminent models of how to successfully fight an insurgency, was produced by 
a difference in the thinking of two military leaders, namely General MacArthur 
and General Otis. It was during this time that the U.S. began to understand that 
confronting unconventional threats required more than a mere change in tactics 
in order to achieve success --it requires a profound understanding of the society 
that is waging the unconventional struggle. Thereafter, the U.S. military has 
attempted to use native population in its effort, not only to increase the level of 
intelligence, but also “to learn about the unfamiliar culture, language, and social 
systems” of the enemy (Bundt, 2004, p.10). As Bundt (2004) says, 
counterinsurgency efforts are enhanced when “work with the local population 
counters the enemy’s use of terrorism by employing culturally, religiously, and 
socially acceptable methods of pacification” (p.10). 
2. Use of Force 
Upon the surrender of Manila to the U.S. troops, Filipino insurgents 
continued to maintain their position around the city and pressed the top American 
officials to recognize their right to establish an independent government. Several 
negotiation rounds took place between the insurgents and the American 
commanders. Acting under the orders from Washington, both Merritt and Otis 
delayed a final settlement of the situation which further deteriorated the relations 
between the U.S. troops and Filipino insurgents. Under increasing pressure from 
the rebels to grand them autonomy, General Otis developed a gradual aversion 
toward the Filipino insurgents. As Welch (1979) noted, “[h]e became convinced 
that only military defeat would subdue their [Filipinos] arrogance and pretensions” 
(p. 21). As a result, General Otis pressed the officials in Washington to grant him 
a greater autonomy to decide over the start of military actions. In early February 
1899 hostilities broke between the U.S. forces and Filipino insurgents. As a result 
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of disproportionate firepower at their disposal, the American troops won the 
conventional phase after only two days. General Otis concluded that he won and 
directed his efforts to capture the rest of Luna’s army. In order to achieve this 
objective, General Otis sent out “task forces to find, fix and destroy” the 
insurgents (Asprey, 1994, p. 127). The end result, as Asprey recounts, was that 
these columns “found little, fixed virtually nothing, but destroyed numerous 
villages” (p. 127).  
Not only did General Otis tactic of sending expeditions to punish the 
insurgents not produce tangible results, but it also tended to alienate the few pro-
American Filipinos. The lack of coherent planning to fight a guerrilla war 
prevented the U.S. army from mounting successful campaigns in the early 
stages. The lack of desire of the American troops to stay in one place long 
enough to secure a support base made gaining the people’s cooperation 
impossible. As a result people refused to provide information. These people 
believed that if they talked to the American forces, they would be targeted by the 
guerrillas as soon as the army left their area. As time passed, insurgents were 
able to mount more successful attacks against the American troops. This 
prompted the army to retaliate, often resorting to torture and related tactics to get 
information from the general populace, thus further alienating them. It has been 
reported that one of the preferred techniques U.S. troops used on reluctant 
natives was the “water cure.” In this type of “interrogation,” “four or five gallons of 
water were forced down a man’s throat, then squeezed out by kneeling on his 
stomach” (p. 129). In turn, many of the insurgent combatants retaliated with 
torture tactics of their own, often mutilating their enemies’ bodies. In a further 
escalation of the violence, U.S. forces were reported to have occasionally burnt 
whole villages.  
The most notable account of a situation that arose between American 
troops and a local population involved Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry Battalion 
stationed in Balangiga, a small village in the south Samar. The company was 
deployed for the purpose of rooting out one of the most stubborn guerrillas’ 
leaders, General Vincente Lukban, who was directing the insurgency on the 
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island. Initially, the American troops were welcomed by the villagers because 
they were displeased by rebels’ actions. However, the behavior of the troops 
following their arrival led the people to side with the rebels, eventually leading to 
the massacre of the U.S. soldiers at the hands of insurgents (Boot, 2002, p. 100). 
Disturbed by the unsanitary conditions the villagers had to live in, 
Company commander Captain Thomas W. Connell was reported to have 
“demanded that Filipinos clean up the mess” around their houses (p. 100). Their 
refusal prompted him to take drastic measures, including using forced labor at 
gunpoint. Connell apparently was unaware that his actions were creating a state 
of discontent among the people. He thought that he was just being “a fellow 
Catholic (who) had a special empathy for the villagers, and (that) he and his men 
were welcome because Pedro Abayan, Balagiga’s presidente (mayor), had 
asked the army to send a contingent to protect the town from ‘pirates’.” (p. 100).  
As a result of Connell’s incorrect assessment of the local situation, he 
didn’t find out that rebels had infiltrated the community until it was too late. On 
the morning of September 28 at 5:30, Connell’s company was caught completely 
unprepared by the rebel attack; an attack which in just 15 minutes saw three 
officers and 35 soldiers killed, and 36 wounded, some of them severely (p. 101). 
The survivors managed to escape in five wooden canoes. The conflict worsened 
when Company G, 9th Infantry stationed in Basey, upon hearing the bad news, 
set off for Balangiga the following day aboard a steamer. To make sure that they, 
too, would not be overrun by insurgents when the company was close to shore, 
the troops opened fire in order to drive out any remaining Filipinos from the 
village (p. 102). 
3. Securing People’s Loyalty 
As a whole, the campaign U.S. forces waged in the Philippines was not 
characterized by wide-spread abuses, even though the degree of efficiency 
varied from place to place, depending on the leadership qualities of the military 
personnel in charge. Fortunately, one of the main emphases had been to 
strengthen Philippine social programs. Here, many soldiers distributed food to 
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hungry population and were involved in various community projects (e.g. helping 
build schools, roads and bridges, and staging sanitary campaigns, and even to 
“set up courts run by the natives” (p. 115). The overall control of the population 
was exercised through Filipinos who acted “as police chiefs, mayors, and 
municipal officials,” while the Americans tried to retain only an advisory role (p. 
113). An important component of the campaign had been the use of incentives to 
motivate guerrilla combatants to surrender. In addition to the increasing political 
autonomy granted to Filipinos’, whenever a person turned in “a gun, (s/he) could 
receive either a cash bounty or the release of a prisoner of war” without any 
further inquiry from the security forces (Joes, 1996, p. 49). Moreover, insurgents 
who surrendered to the authorities were generally treated well. This served to 
lessen the effectiveness of the guerrilla’s propaganda, thus isolating them from 
the population and “making their cause seem hopeless” (p. 49) 
4. Conclusions  
The successful conclusion of the Philippine insurgency cannot be 
attributed to the use of decisive force—the troops were outnumbered by the 
insurgents by 80,000 to 24,000. Rather, as Boot (2002) says, “the skilful 
employment of carrots and sticks” by the U.S. led to their success (p. 126). 
People sided with the Americans because their programs produced real changes 
within their lives, whereas Aguinaldo and his followers had not shown interest in 
carrying out reforms. Among the most successful actions by U.S. troops included 
those carried out by veterans of the Indian Wars and by those who had served in 
previous campaigns in Caribbean.  
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IV. BRITISH ARMY’S INVOLVEMENT IN SMALL WARS 
There are only two powers in the world … the sword and the spirit. 
In the long run, the sword is always defeated by the spirit. 
Napoleon Bonaparte7 
The previous chapter examined the level of understanding of the 
operational environment exhibited by U.S. forces, the level of violence used to 
achieve U.S. purposes, and last but not least, how the U.S. troops secured the 
cooperation of the local peoples.  
The current chapter will examine the same elements for the British forces 
involved in counterinsurgency endeavors in South Yemen and Oman.  
A. FIGHTING INSURGENTS IN SOUTH YEMEN 
Due to its strategic location, the town of Aden has always been regarded 
as “a pivotal point for British strategy in the Indian Ocean and in the Peninsula 
[Arabian] as a whole” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 6). Its importance in the maintenance of 
Britain’s position as a world power further increased when, following the Second 
World War, Britain granted independence to Cyprus. At that time Aden became 
the headquarters of Middle East Command and it was regarded along with 
Singapore and Britain itself “as one of three vital permanent military bases” 
(Newsinger, 2002, p. 108).  
The rise of Arab nationalism put increasing pressure on the British position 
in the Middle East, which, according to Newsinger (2002), came from two 
different directions (p. 108). Within the “Protectorate”, which in February 1959, 
comprised a federation of six polities, Beihan, Fahdli, Aulaqi, Dhala, Lower Yafa 
and Upper Aulaqi, the threat to the British authority came from neighbouring 
North Yemen (Newsinger, 2002, p. 109). The Imam Ahmed, an autocratic ruler, 
pursued a constant confrontational policy towards the British, encouraging local 
tribes to revolt. During most of the 1950s, he stirred up a series of incidents that 
culminated in what Gregory Blaxland calls, “the Border War” (as cited in 
                                            
7 See Horne, A. (1988). To Lose a Battle: France, 1940. London: Penguin Books, p. 74. 
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Newsinger, 2002, p. 109). In Aden itself, the danger was posed by the 
increasingly influential Aden Trade Union (ATU) and its left-wing nationalist 
leadership. Following the example set by other movements, ATU started to play 
a very important role in “cultivating political awareness among their working class 
members” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 31).  
Attempting to contain the growing urban Arab nationalism, Britain decided 
to rely on the loyal sultans and emirs within the Protectorate. The decision to 
work through sultans and emirs produced discontent among the Aden population. 
Many of the people in Aden disliked the idea of the British collaborating with 
much poorer Sultanates (most of who relied heavily on the British for support) (p. 
110). It was believed that strengthening the Sultans position would have a 
negative impact on the level of civil liberties experienced by the people of Aden. 
As a result, from 1964 to 1967 British troops were confronted with two, distinct 
insurgencies: one in the Radfan Mountains and the other in Aden. 
The Radfan insurgency commenced in mid-October 1963 as a tribal revolt 
initiated by Qutaybi tribes. Upon their return from North Yemen, where tribesmen 
fought alongside the Republican rebels, British forces attempted to confiscate the 
tribesmen’s weapons. In the skirmish that ensued, the Qutaybi leader, Galib al-
Buzah, was killed, leading his son to initiate a mass revolt. Trying to retake 
control of the area (and, thus, preventing the revolt’s spread), the British Army 
carried out two conventional-type, expeditionary operations. Within what was 
called “Operation Nutcracker,” an emphasis was placed on airpower and the 
employment of mechanized troops. When this strategy failed to achieve the 
desired results, the British commenced “Radforce” which consisted of 
paratroopers and Special Air Service (SAS) troops. They were flown from Britain 
to “cut the tribesmen’s link with North Yemen and than push southwards to 
Radfan” (p. 72). “Radforce” accomplish their mission by May 9, 1964, but 
suffered losses. As a result the British committed a regular division to fight the 
insurgents and to take control of the main wadis of Radfan. Although British 
forces succeeded in defeating the insurgents militarily, they were not able to 
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completely suppress the revolt. Upon the involvement of the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) the insurgency spread into neighboring tribal areas.  
Inside Aden, the NLF conducted traditional urban guerrilla warfare. After 
London decided to support the coalition of the People’s Socialist Party (PSP) and 
the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), NLF underground cells launched their 
open resistance against the British forces (commencing in late November of 
1964). The NLF was able to incite the population--using subversive tactics, 
propaganda and intimidation--to exercise civil disobedience, initiating major 
clashes with the police. According to Julian Paget (as cited in Newsinger, 2002), 
all the police abuses during the clashes were subsequently exploited for 
propaganda purposes (p. 121).  
Through military actions aimed at police forces and especially at its 
Special Branch, the NLF succeeded in reducing the effectiveness of the security 
forces (Newsinger, 2002, p. 121). In order to help strengthen their intelligence 
gathering capabilities, British forces imposed severe restrictions on the 
movements of the population. Additionally, they launched massive search 
operation to seize weapons and apprehend insurgents. Both strategies served to 
increase the people’s discontent with British rule. In the end, British troops pulled 
out of South Yemen, lacking political and popular support, both at home and in 
Aden. 
1. Understanding the Operational Environment 
a. Political Mobilization 
 The National Liberation Front for Occupied South Yemen (NLF) 
was created in late 1963 in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), encompassing 
several clandestine organizations that were structured after Nasserite and 
Baathist models. Upon its creation, the NLF “declared an armed revolt against 
the British rule” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 53). The declared goals of the NLF 
insurgency was to: 1) destroy the Federation, 2) overthrow the feudal rulers, 3) 
evict the British and 4) establish a Communist-style people’s democracy 
(Newsinger, 2002, p. 114). In order to accomplish this, the NLF instigated both 
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strikes aimed at destabilizing the government and civil disobedience. A major 
step was taken toward employing guerrilla warfare tactics when the NLF took 
control over the Radfan revolt. According to Kostiner (1984) this decision came 
as a result of the relatively large autonomy being enjoyed by the people in the 
region, coupled with the fact that there were no permanent governmental troops 
to pose a threat for the insurgents (p. 71). 
 In order to rally the support of the people, the NLF relied heavily on 
propaganda aimed at exploiting people’s grievances against both the 
government and British rule (Kostiner, 1984, p. 103). Quoting al-Shacbī, Kostiner 
asserts that the major principle guiding the NLF’s actions was: 
…to exercise a political, cultural and social struggle, to comprise all 
the inhabitants in the framework of a progressive society which 
would live on political and social justice… and would necessarily 
bring the end of feudalism, monopolism and particularism [of the 
prerogatives given to] descents [of] tribalism and primitivism and 
the signs of the ancient past … to save the Arab people from the 
reality of conquest, reaction, divisions and political and economic 
exploitation (Kostiner, 1984, p. 96) 
 The tribal nature of the Federation society in existence at the time 
imposed upon the NLF the need to use a dual strategy in order to carry out its 
desired political mobilization. Whereas in the cities the main emphasis of the NLF 
had been on laboring to establish secret cells to carry out both ideological and 
military actions, in the countryside the NLF relied on the persuasive powers of 
senior tribal leaders to accomplish its goals. The NLF was active in inciting  
students to rebel against the authorities, and succeeded in establishing secret 
underground cells, even at the high school level (i. e., Dathinah and Bayhan) 
(Kostiner, 1984p. 100). Also, they succeeded in recruiting supporters from 
among the relatives of victims killed by British and Federation security forces 
(Kostiner, 1984, p. 100).  
 With regard to gaining support in rural areas, the NLF’s senior 
leaders played a very important role. By traveling to many villages, they not only 
explained the aims of the revolution to the people, but also tried to pacify different 
warring factions and direct their effort against the British (Kostiner, 1984, p. 100). 
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Instead of engaging in direct fighting, insurgents’ leaders served as “planners, 
administrators and political agitators” in order to direct the actions of the 
tribesmen (Kostiner, 1984, p. 76).  Illustrating the NLF’s role, Kostiner (1984) 
wrote 
In all of these social pressure points, the NLF acted mainly as a 
stimulus, trying to recruit potential fighters and to manipulate them 
to the NLF’s purpose. One way to achieve this was to expose the 
population to the authorities’ reaction and pressure. The severity of 
the British bombing, detention, suppressions of demonstrations and 
other emergency measures precipitated a counter reaction by the 
population” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 100) 
 To make their message appeal to their target audience in the 
Radfan mountains, the NLF convinced people that their struggle “was an 
extension of previous struggles, notably of Ibn al-Aydarus’s 1957 revolt” 
(Kostiner, 1984, p. 100). Moreover, playing the conspiratorial card, the NLF 
suggested that Britain’s real intention was to inflict harm on local society 
(Kostiner, 1984, p. 66). Their main purpose for using propaganda in the area 
(e.g., broadcasts and leaflets) was to vilify the British troops by pointing out 
reprehensible tactics used by them in fighting the insurgents, while emphasizing 
the NLF’s charitable motives for fighting. Propaganda served also to expose and 
publicly threaten any British collaborators (Kostiner, 1984, p. 103).  
b. Natural Environment 
 Organized in North Yemen under Egyptian supervision, NLF 
insurgents started to cross the border into South Yemen and conduct guerilla 
actions in Radfan Mountains. Its proximity to North Yemen allowed NLF forces to 
acquire help from the friendly regime in the north. This assistance consisted both 
in safe heaven and material support. The superior topographical knowledge of 
the insurgents permitted them to control the main route from Aden to Bayda (in 
North Yemen) (Kostiner, 1984, p. 71). They were able to move throughout 
sparsely populated region in small parties, using donkeys and camels to carry 
their weapons and supplies. Assessing the insurgents’ military strategy, 
Newsinger (2002) writes “The NLF fought a classic guerrilla war. They refused to 
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stand and fight, except on rare occasions, and instead melted away into the 
landscape, subjecting the British to continual sniping and laying fresh mines 
every night” (p. 116). Using guerrilla tactics they were able to attack British 
convoys on the main roads, afterwards to quickly disappear into the mountains. 
This high mobility allowed them to successfully cut the Dhala road by the end of 
1963 (Newsinger, 2002, p. 114).  
 Consequently, Federal Regular Army (FRA)8 and British forces 
were committed to carry out the objectives of Operation Nutcracker. Thinking that 
they were facing an old type, tribal insurrection, the combined forces made 
extensive use of conventional tactics with a special emphasis on airpower. 
Beginning in early January of 1964, Operation Nutcracker was of an 
expeditionary type “carried out by three battalions of the Federal Regular Army 
(FRA) supported by British artillery, tanks and airpower” (Newsinger, 2002, p. 
114).  
 A second attempt to subdue the tribes was done using another 
expeditionary force--Radforce, consisting of about 3, 600 men, which included 
paratroopers and Special Air Service (SAS) troops (Kostiner, 1984, p. 71). Initial 
attempts to take control of the area through an airborne operation failed. Only 
continuous air support for the nine-man SAS team sent to mark out the drop 
zone prevented the insurgent from overtaking the area (Newsinger, 2002, p. 
114). It was the commitment of an additional regular division in the main wādīs of 
Radfan that allowed British to bring the rebel area under control. However, 
because of the rough terrain and hot climate of South Yemen, combined with the 
fact that British troops had to overcome difficulties posed by a lack of intelligence, 
they suffered further losses as a result of rebel ambushes (Kostiner, 1984, p. 72).  
c. Human Environment 
 Although culturally homogenous, South Yemeni society comprised 
two different ethnic groupings which had experienced different paths of 
                                            
8 Federal Regular Army (FRA) was created by the British in 1962 from the combination of the 
“Aden Protectorate Levies” and the “Tribal Guards”. It encompassed members of various tribes 
led by British and Arab officers (Kostiner, 1984, p. 12). 
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development—port cities and the countryside. Gerber (1988) distinguishes 
between “the port of Aden, with its immediate hinterland and the countryside” (p. 
53). Whereas the majority of the inland population consisted of a mixture of 
settled and nomadic Arab tribes, in Aden, it was a combination of Arab, 
European and Asian people. Because all groups labored to preserve their own 
language, religion and cultural individuality, there were permanent tensions and 
disputes “between the Bedouin tribes and urban population and among the tribes 
themselves” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 1 and 29).  
The nature of tribal organization encouraged social segmentation thus 
preventing centralized control over the entire population. Though chieftainship 
was hereditary, the authority vested in Amirs, Sultans or Na’ibs was not absolute. 
Rather it “was distributed at every point of tribal structure and political leadership 
[was] limited to situations in which a tribe or a segment of it act[ed] corporately” 
(Gerber, 1988, p. 55). However, as Dresch (as cited in Gerber, 1988) writes, 
“Great shaykhs in particular, and great shaykhly houses, have powers of their 
own which are an important part of the world in question” (p. 193). As a result, 
competition for tribal leadership sometimes took on violent forms, which led to 
the development of a strong warrior ethos among the tribe members. According 
to Newsinger (2002):  
The Radfan tribesmen made excellent guerrillas. They had been 
born to warfare, and had been brought up to regard possession of a 
rifle as a sign of maturity. They were good natural shots with 
wonderful powers of observation: they thus made fine snipers, for 
they knew just where to look for the targets. They could conceal 
themselves perfectly, and also used to place marks on the ground, 
so as to know the range exactly. Being accustomed to carrying out 
lightning raids and ambushes, they could move far and fast across 
mountains and were thus an elusive enemy. They were also 
extremely courageous, as was shown by their capacity to fight on in 
the face of heavy artillery and air attacks (p. 114). 
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 In contrast to what was experienced in the countryside, in towns the 
real authority was in the hands of Sayyids9—men who represented both the 
social and political elite. Their sanctity played an important role in the local 
balance of power and spared cities from being overrun by hostile tribes (Gerber, 
1988, p. 66). 
 In their attempt to pacify and modernize Yemeni society, British 
introduced a series of reforms that altered the social fabric. Of significance in this 
regard were British efforts to strengthen the position of various Sultans as heads 
of state. Such efforts often produced discontent and resistance among the 
common tribesmen and “either exacerbated or generated social divisions all over 
South Yemen” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 14). British help for the Sultans usually came in  
the form of helping them to develop armed forces and other social structures to 
fight against tribes who engaged in looting or inter-tribal fighting (Kostiner, 1984, 
p. 11). 
2. Use of Force 
A misperception of the real nature of the rebellion by the British troops, 
coupled with their lack of intelligence, prompted British forces to pursue a military 
approach in both the Radfan Mountains and Aden in their effort to defeat the 
insurgencies. With regard to the Radfan campaign, according to Fred Halliday 
(as cited in Newsinger, 2002): 
 British had all long misunderstood the situation, thinking they were 
up against old-style tribal resistance’ that could be suppressed by 
punitive columns, bombing and the taking of hostages. Instead, in 
the NLF they were encountering an increasingly well-armed 
guerrilla force that was conducting, not a particularist tribal 
rebellion, but a revolutionary war.”(p. 118). 
To increase the efficiency of their actions, the British imposed severe 
restrictions on the movement of the population through curfews and the 
establishment of “restricted” areas (Newsinger, 2002, p. 117). Within the Radfan 
                                            
9 According to Kostiner (1984) Sayyids were considered the descendants of the Prophet. 
They performed different social functions (i.e. teachers, judges and political mediators) and their 
residential territory was considered sacred place where violence was forbidden (p. 2).  
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Mountains, the British troops’ attempted to sever contacts between insurgents 
and their bases of support. Emphasis was placed on conventional methods, 
especially air strikes aimed at destroying crops and livestock. For this purpose, 
the British Air Force used large quantities of ammunition. According to Newsinger 
(2002), “Between the end of April and the end of June 1964, Hunter jets fired 
2,508 rockets and nearly 200,000 cannon rounds, while the four-engined 
Shackleton bombers dropped 3,504-20 lb. antipersonnel mines, and 14-1000 lb. 
and fired 20,000 cannon rounds” (p. 117). 
On the other hand, during the Aden rebellion British forces relied heavily 
on ground-based search operations to uncover weapons and to apprehend NLF 
members in lieu of air power. Still, these actions led to a series of abuses which, 
according to Newsinger, involved both physical mistreatment and racial 
discriminations, further alienating local population and not producing their desired 
results. Revealing the inefficiency of such operations, Newsinger recounts a case 
where over a period of eight months, one unit searched 35,000 people and 8,000 
vehicles to find 12 grenades and six pistols (Newsinger, 2002, p. 122). 
Unwittingly, security forces pushed more people into the insurgents’ camp 
through their violent conduct. Moreover, as later investigations revealed, road 
block duty often provided British troops with ample opportunities to extort money 
from the people in an abuse of their power (Newsinger, 2002, p. 129).  
British operations improved significantly with the employment of small, 
mobile patrols. Operating mostly during the night, disguised as Arabs, SAS and 
Anglian’s Regiment squads were able to apprehend guerrillas and seize 
weapons. To illustrate their successes in these ventures, Newsinger (2002) cites 
the example of one squad which “was responsible for the capture of 14 guerrillas 
and seizure of 105 grenades, five automatic weapons, three pistols, two rocket 




3. Securing People’s Loyalty 
Because the political10 and economic11 reforms introduced by the British 
were usually tailored to fit the British needs, rather than those of Yemenite 
society, these reforms failed to produce the desired results. In fact they disturbed 
the delicate social equilibrium in the region, while stirring anti-colonial sentiment. 
As E. Kedourie (as cited in Kostiner, 1984) has pointed out, “European ideas of 
progress and democracy intruded into Third World societies, have often aroused 
an anti-European reaction” (p. 14). The loss of traditional social and political 
positions, namely by moving the base of power from the many to a few elites, 
allowed the NLF to attract people’s support for their “nationalist” cause, while 
spurring on hostile sentiments against the British (Newsinger, 2002, p. 122). 
The peoples’ opposition took a wide variety of forms ranging from tribal 
revolts in the countryside to demonstrations and riots in Aden. British efforts to 
“pacify” the society revealed a paradox--whereas Britain’s stated intention was to 
establish a democratic regime, its response to NLF’s provocations was marked 
by the use of coercive methods in order to quell the violence. Moreover, to split 
the rebels from the people and thereby to reassert control over the people, the 
British resorted to the use of massive air strikes which often resulted in the 
destruction of crops and personal properties. Additionally, inappropriate conduct 
of search operations led to numerous human rights violations, especially racial 
abuses, all of which, in time, served to undermine popular support of the British. 
Thomas Mockaitis (as cited in Newsinger, 2002) admits that British troops 
operating in South Yemen lacked “‘anything like a hearts and minds campaign’ in 
Radfan or anywhere else” (p. 118).  
 
                                            
10 British strengthen the position of the Sultans in the society by giving them power to control 
the government. This way Sultans controlled all the governmental expenditure and tax 
collections.  
11 Within the Protectorate, British introduce land reforms which led to an unequal distribution 
of land among the tribesmen. Moreover, the introduction of roads prevented the tribesmen from 
continuing their traditional occupations (i.e., guides and leaders for caravans). Within Aden the 
modernization of the port and the oil refineries demanded skilled and permanent labor. Thus 
many unskilled Arab people were left unemployed.  
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4. Conclusions 
The British campaign in South Yemen provides ample evidence that 
neither a massive use of firepower nor tactical proficiency is sufficient to defeat 
an insurgency. By concentrating almost exclusively on defeating guerrillas 
militarily through conventional means, British forces underestimated the potential 
of guerrilla tactics. Moreover, they misjudged the ability of the guerrillas to 
persuade and mobilize the people. The lack of useful intelligence by the British 
caused its security forces to commit numerous abuses against the populace 
during field operations. Additionally, the bad attitudes displayed by many British 
troops and their condescension toward the native populations further increased 
the people’s discontent with British rule. As a result, even though Britain never 
lost a battle with insurgents, British forces lost the war because they alienated 
the people. By way of contrast, the NLF was able to better adapt its message 
and methods to suit the needs of the South Yemeni society. In the words of 
Kostiner, “the significance of the guerrilla warfare was that it imbued South 
Yemen with novel conditions of chronic fighting, riots, strikes, and general 
disruption” (Kostiner, 1984, p. 177).  
B. OMAN INSURGENCIES 
Positioned between South Yemen and the Gulf, the sultanate’s strategic 
location in the Persian Gulf area was demonstrated by the fact that it controlled 
the southern shore of the Straits of Hormuz. With a population estimated at 
750,000, distributed unevenly over 82,000 square miles of land, the sultanate 
came under British influence during the 1870s. The Sultan still retained his ruling 
position; but, as Fred Halliday (as cited in Newsinger, 2002) acknowledges, he 
was “under the effective control of his British advisor” (p. 132). Due to tyrannical 
rule by certain sultans, Oman’s history recorded long periods of unrest that can 
be traced back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Inland tribes constituted 
another major source of instability for Oman. This was especially true among 
tribes who belonged to the Ibadhi sect, whose members wanted to be ruled 
exclusively by their religious leader. These differences were temporarily settled 
by the Treaty of Seeb in 1920, which allowed for greater autonomy for the Imam 
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of Oman in interior regions (mainly around the town of Nizwa), while the Sultan of 
Muscat still retained nominal control. As Newsinger (2002) writes, “This situation 
continued until the 1950s with Sultan Said showing no interest whatsoever in 
trying to regain control of the area” (p. 136).  
The circumstances changed after the prospects of oil reserves stirred up a 
rivalry between the British and other players in the area (among them were Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)). 
According to one account, the Saudi family and Aramco, an American oil 
company, provided substantial support to Imam Ghalib bin Ali to establish an 
independent state (Newsinger, 2002, p. 136). To prevent this from happening, 
British forces provided military and financial support to the sultans of Oman, Said 
bin Taimur and his son, Qaboos bin Said Al Said. This effort was mainly directed 
to suppress two rebellions which destabilized internal situation of Oman. 
Whereas, the first insurgency had flared up in Jebel-Akhdar in the mid 1950s 
from tribal grounds, the second occurred in Dhofar from 1962 to 1976 and was 
communist inspired.  
In the first case, Imam Ghalib, upon his appointment as the Imam for the 
inland tribes, declared his regions’ independence from the Sultan of Muscat, 
simultaneously attempting to join the Arab League. Subsequently, he continually 
tried to undermine the Sultan’s efforts to take control of the interior by leading 
sporadic revolts against the Sultan’s Armed Forces for almost five years. After 
the Sultan’s forces took the Imam’s capital, Nizwa, in September 1955, capturing 
the Imam in the process, his brother, Talib, took refuge in Saudi Arabia and 
organized the opposition’s resistance. For more than one and a half years Talib 
laid the foundation for the Oman Revolutionary Movement (ORM). In mid-June 
1957, he and his trained and equipped rebel force landed on the Batinah coast 
along with large quantities of weapons and American mines (Newsinger, 2002, p. 
136). Through a series of small-scale operations, rebels continually harassed 
and ambushed the Sultan’s forces. The culminating point of the campaign was 
the destruction of the Oman Regiment in July, when insurgents retook Nizwa and 
“drove the Sultan’s forces out of the interior” (p. 136). Only constant British 
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support for the Sultan’s Armed Forces and, in the end, the commitment of SAS 
troops put an end to the insurgency.  
In the case of Dhofar’s insurgency, the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) 
capitalized on the dissatisfaction of the local population with the oppressive 
system of the Sultan bin Taimur. Quoting Fred Halliday, Newsinger (2002) writes, 
“while Oman was a British colony, Dhofar was an Omani colony, ruled even more 
oppressively than the rest of the sultanate” (p. 140). Since its founding in 1962, 
the DLF had gradually pursued a more confrontational path, ultimately launching 
several small-scale attacks against the Sultan’s forces. Lacking a force powerful 
enough to confront the Jebel tribesmen, the Sultan avoided taking vigorous 
actions in response to the attacks. It was the attempt to assassinate the Sultan 
that triggered the campaign (Newsinger, 2002, p. 141). 
1. Understanding the Operational Environment 
a. Political Mobilization 
 Kinship and religious ties played a central role in the Imam’s efforts 
to rally the people in support of his struggle to make an independent state. Tribal 
connections allowed rebels to establish themselves in some of the tribe’s fortified 
settlements that subsequently became the operational bases for raiding parties 
that proceeded to harass the Sultan’s armed forces. Propaganda was important 
in inciting various clans to join the fight, but was not used on a large scale. 
Though it started as a tribal disturbance of only disaffected Bayt Kathīr 
tribesmen, the Dhofar insurgency developed into a revolutionary war. The 
insurgents were able to infiltrate different organizations and divert their efforts in 
support of the rebels’ cause resulting in the spread of revolutionary ideas. 
Groups such as the Dhofar Benevolent Society (DBS), the Dhofar Soldiers’ 
Organization (DSO) and the local branch of the Arab Nationalists’ Movement 
(ANM) were brought together under the leadership of the DLF. The conglomerate 
that resulted held its first conference in central Dhofar in early June 1965 
(Peterson, 1978, p. 188). In their proclamation, according to Townsend (1977), 
the insurgents called for: 
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liberating the country [i.e., Dhofar] from the rule of the despotic Al 
Bu Said Sultan whose dynasty has been identified with the hordes 
of the British imperialist occupation… This people [i.e., the 
Dhofaris] has long and bitterly suffered from dispersion, 
unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and disease…(p. 98). 
 However, until 1967 no major changes occurred in the DLF’s 
approach toward the insurgency. The DLF’s actions remained limited to 
traditional guerrilla attacks aimed at both intimidating Sultan’s armed forces and 
eliminating the Sultan.  
 The turning point for the DLF ideological action came after the 
British expulsion from South Yemen, and the subsequent establishment of the 
PDRY. The DLF magnified its ideological activity in response to the external 
support provided by the PDRY, the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, 
Iraq and various Palestinian guerrilla organizations. As a result of this ideological 
change, the DLF attempted to rally the support of a larger segment of the Omani 
population. Thus in 1968, during the Second Congress, the DLF changed its 
name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf 
(PFLOAG). The change of title was made to let the impression that Front’s 
actions envisaged a much broader area than Dhofar (p. 100). 
 The year 1968 also marked a radicalization in the insurgents’ views 
(Peterson, 1978, p. 189). According to Townsend (1977), “the ideological dogma 
of Marxism-Leninist or the Maoist dialectic gradually became the motivating force 
for opposition to a ruler who would make no concession to the present” (p. 97). 
PFLOAG’s successes led to the emergence of other groups. The most prominent 
from among them was the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman 
and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG), which, according to Peterson, encompassed a 
coalition of minor, dissident groups. Finally, in 1971 all revolutionary movements 
merged into a single entity under the banner of the PFLOAG (Peterson, 1978, p. 
189) 
b. Natural Environment 
 The rough terrain of Oman allowed the insurgents to make 
extensive use of guerrilla tactics to repel conventional attacks, both in Jebel 
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Akhdar and Dhofar. Moreover, their early successes over the Sultan’s mercenary 
troops were further enhanced by the rebels’ intimate knowledge of the natural 
environment. Knowing the topography (e.g., trails and paths), they were able to 
elude their pursuers and to infiltrate to within close-range of the Sultan’s forces. 
The insurgents laid mines on the roads and around the camps, afterwards 
disappearing into the mountains. As a result, the Sultan urged the British troops 
to intervene to bring the rebellion to a halt.  
 Acting in a manner consistent with their old, colonial ways, in Jebel 
Akhdar, the British launched a massive air campaign to dislodge the rebels from 
what Michael Dewar (as cited in Newsinger, 2002) called, “one of the greatest 
natural fortresses in the world”. Despite the huge quantity of munitions fired and 
the air blockade imposed by British forces, the results were only of limited 
success. British forces were neither able to break the insurgents’ will to fight nor 
to separate them from the supportive population. The turning point of the 
campaign came on November 18, 1958 when the “D Squadron of 22 SAS, about 
60 strong, arrived in Oman” (p. 137). Within three months, through extensive 
efforts to patrol the area in small groups, they we able to clear the lower slopes of 
the Jebel and identify the best routes onto the plateau. Subsequently, they used 
these trails to infiltrate and destroy the rebels in conjunction with a diversionary 
operation conducted by conventional troops.  
 The sparsely populated terrain of western Dhofar proved to be ideal 
territory for the employment of guerrilla tactics. From their bases, insurgents were 
able to conduct raids on the costal plains against the Sultan’s troops. The Jabal 
Mountains’ proximity to the PDRY allowed the insurgents to continually replenish 
their strength, helping them to maintain their resolve (Townsend, 1977, p. 100). 
Aside from rough terrain, the climate also presented a major obstacle to the 
counterinsurgent forces. Early in 1971, “Operation Hornet” was suspended 
because of the onset of the rainy season. As. Newsinger (2002) writes: “the 
monsoon brought rain, mist and cloud that closed down air support and left the 
SAF [Sultan Armed Forces] vulnerable to attack” (p. 144).  
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c. Human Environment 
 The physical layout of the country dictated different evolutionary 
pathways for the tribally-based Omani society. The only common attribute of the 
inland and costal inhabitants was Islam. The territorial segmentation that affected 
the human environment also influenced traditional occupations and a tribe’s 
social relations with other groups.  
 Wilkinson (1977) distinguishes between people living in the 
mountains and those living in the plains. Whereas, the first groups tended to be 
pastoralists and nomadic, the second groups were more settled, subsisting on 
trade, agriculture and fishing (p. 32). Because tribes were in competition over 
scarce resources, people developed various degrees of caution in relation with 
other groups. Townsend (1977) points out that the inland peoples were more 
reticent and distrustful of strangers than were the peoples inhabiting the coast (p. 
28).  
 Additionally, the struggle for supremacy between various ethnic 
groups (or even among the members of the same tribe) caused a number of 
inter-racial and inter-tribal confrontations. Eventually, these struggles led to the 
development of a stronger warrior ethos among the members of specific tribes. 
Quoting Bertram Thomas about the martial characteristics of the Omani society, 
Townsend (1977) writes:  
The people, composed of warlike and rival tribes, have always 
found law and order irksome. They love unfettered personal liberty 
more than life, and glory in their hereditary wars. The alternative of 
an extraneously imposed authority has in the past been acceptable 
to them only by force…(p. 96). 
 The Sultan bin Taimur’s goal to rule over the loose Omani society 
placed a special emphasis on the use of force. In order to retain total control over 
the inland tribes, the Sultan bin Taimur exercised a despotic reign, marked by 
numerous  abuses and human rights violations, which created a permanent state  
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of unrest. Gradually, the opposition against his rule changed from being an old-
style tribal revolt to being a more organized Marxist–Leninist revolution 
(Townsend, 1977, p. 97). 
2. Use of Force 
The two Sultans, Bin Taimur and his son Qaboos, took different 
approaches to the problem of maintaining their right to rule. Whereas Sultan bin 
Taimur relied excessively on force to subdue the insurgents, Sultan Qaboos 
applied a mixture of military, economic and political reforms.  
The initial failures of forces loyal to Sultan’s bin Taimur to take the rebel 
strongholds through conventional attacks eventually led him to rely upon British 
military power. Since the bulk of the British troops in Oman were conventional, 
their response was a massive use of firepower, a strategy Britain developed 
during the colonial war at the beginning of the century. In Jebel Akhdar, the 
massive use of air strikes and artillery bombardment of the plateau throughout 
1958 had little effect on breaking the rebel’s will to fight. Instead, it often resulted 
in massive fatalities to livestock and to the destruction of crops. According to one 
account, the army even retaliated by burning a village to the ground after one of 
its soldiers was killed. David Smiley, who was in charge with the reorganization 
of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, (as cited in Newsinger, 2002) writes, “We went 
systematically from house to house, setting each alight with paraffin until nothing 
remained but smoldering ruins” (p. 137). In Dhofar, the blockade imposed by the 
Sultan’s forces and the massive retaliations, including the destruction of the 
water wells, alienated the population.  
On the other hand, after the Sultan Qaboos took power, he emphasized 
attempting to separate the rebels from their support bases through a campaign 
aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the people (Newsinger, 2002, p. 142). 
Quoting Tony Jeapes, an SAS squadron commander at the time, Newsinger 
(2002) writes that after 1970, the Dhofar campaign was “a war in which both 
sides concentrated upon winning the support of the civilians of the Jebel Dhofar 
and which was won in the end by civil development, with military action merely a 
 60 
means to that end” (p. 142). So the SAS troops, many of whom spoke fluent 
Arabic as well as a number of tribal dialects, spearheaded the Sultan’s efforts to 
win-over the local people (Newsinger, 2002, p. 143). The military actions 
conducted by SAS-led teams capitalized on local militia organized around 
“pseudo-gangs,” giving them a twofold advantage – an increase in actionable 
intelligence and allowing the SAS to fight rebels using local methods (p. 144).  
3. Securing People’s Loyalty 
Sultan bin Taimur’s visions concerning effective rule markedly differ from 
those of his son, Sultan Qaboos. Whereas Sultan bin Taimur maintained social 
and political control by ruling with an iron fist and keeping his people deliberately 
impoverished and uneducated, Sultan Qaboos was able to secure their loyalty 
through undertaking measures directed at improving their lives (Newsinger, 
2002, p. 133). These different perspectives concerning the importance of the 
people in an insurgency prompted antithetical approaches to the insurgency. 
Describing Sultan’s bin Taimur approach, Townsend (1977) admits that he 
pursued a “negative, repressive, punitive, unimaginative strategy” which was 
exploited by the opposition forces. According to Townsend (1977), “Moderates in 
Oman and Dhofar, increasingly alienated by the Sultan’s policies, were attracted 
to the extremist forces of change because these forces represented the only 
effective opposition to the Sultan” (p. 101). 
Conversely, Sultan Qaboos’ strategy of winning people to his side was 
comprised of five elements: 1) “the offer of a general amnesty to all those of his 
subjects who had opposed his father”, 2) “the ending of the anarchic status of 
Dhofar and its formal incorporation into Oman as the ‘southern province’”, 3) 
“effective military opposition to the rebels who did not accept the amnesty offer, 
4) “a vigorous nation-wide program of development”, and 5) “a diplomatic 
initiative aimed first at having Oman recognized as a genuine Arab state with its 
legal form of government, and second, at isolating People’s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen” from other Arab states (p. 101).  
Essential to the successful cessation of the insurgency were the general 
amnesty offered by Sultan Qaboos and the civic programs developed. Rebels 
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who surrendered were given money and, after a screening period, were 
incorporated into local tribal militia (“firqat”) “as part of an internal security and 
peace-keeping force” (Townsend, 1977, p. 102). As members of the security 
forces, the surrendered rebels were sent in their old tribal areas together with 
their families. As part of the civic programs, the new Omani government opened 
shops, schools and clinics. In the end, the number of people who surrendered 
and were incorporated in local defence forces was about 2,000. (p. 102).  
4. Conclusions 
In Oman, the British-led counterinsurgency campaigns succeeded in both 
Jebel Akhdar and Dhofar. However, the British victories were only to a very small 
extent due to the superior military force they brought to bear during the 
insurgencies. In Jebel Akhdar, which produced a military campaign that closely 
resembled a traditional tribal rebellion, the superior air power neither broke 
insurgent’s will to fight nor separated them from their support base. It was the 
deployment of SAS troops that changed the balance of forces. They understood 
the way insurgents’ conducted their operations, and were able to fight back with 
the same weapons. Conversely, during the Dhofar insurgency, the heightened 
success of the British forces came about mainly as a result of the radical change 
in the country’s regime. Through a series of judicious reforms that emphasized a 
“hearts and minds” approach, Sultan Qaboos enhanced British efforts to fight the 
communist-inspired insurgency. Whereas military actions were aimed mainly at 
cutting off insurgents from their external support, civic actions were aimed at 

























Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, 
nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is 
suppose to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it 
can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of 
their relations, then leave it free to rise into the realm of action. 
Clausewitz12 
The previous chapters systematically examined the current 
unconventional threats and the underlying principles of unconventional warfare. 
Additionally, they considered the U.S. and the British involvement in counter-
insurgency operations.  
The present chapter will investigate the importance of understanding the 
operational environment in the light provided by inferences drawn from the above 
case studies. Moreover, it will examine the role of enhanced language and 
cultural training in the process.  
A. UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies are complicated occurrences, 
which cannot be conceived solely in militaristic terms. Victory or defeat usually 
does not occur as a result of one force militarily crushing the other. Rather, it is 
usually due to a gradual erosion of the popular base of support and the 
subsequent will to fight. Within this struggle, the most important victory is that 
gained over the human spirit. Favorite weapons for this are various forms of 
psychological actions and a persuasive use of propaganda. Hence, as Valeriano 
& Bohannan (1962) note, “whoever wants to defeat guerrilla warfare must 
understand thoroughly three things: his reasons for being, his goals and his 
methods to achieve the stated goals” (p. 3).  
 
 
                                            
12 Clausewitz, C. von (1984). On war. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 578  
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1. Political Mobilization 
A closer look to the social milieu in the U.S., Philippines, South Yemen 
and Oman during the time of their respective insurgencies reveals that these 
societies were undergoing profound social-economic and political 
transformations. Such phenomena interfered with the traditional ways of life of 
the aforementioned societies, thus, altering the existing social order and 
producing unrest among their members.  
Insurgents took advantage of the disorder and unrest, focusing on political 
mobilization, in order to increase their popular support. However, their abilities to 
conduct a persuasive propaganda campaign differed greatly from one place to 
another, and were influenced by several factors, such as: social structure, 
capabilities of dissemination and the availability and capability of people to carry 
out propaganda and agitation.  
A society’s social structure played a very important role because it 
influenced both the complexity and the broadness of the message being 
delivered. Within societies that lacked centralized political control (e.g., as did 
native Indians in the U.S., Jebel Akhdar tribesmen in the Middle East, and many 
societies in the Philippine insurgency), insurgents were less able to conduct a 
consistent political mobilization. The lack of any well-established façade 
organizations limited the spread of their message to a confined geographical 
area inhabited by a particular population linked by blood ties. Moreover, the 
particularity of the problems made the propaganda relevant to only a small part of 
the population.  
Conversely, within societies where the political control of the insurgencies 
was assumed by well-established underground groups, the problems for the 
counter-insurgent forces increased considerably. These secret societies were 
able to use every historical and cultural aspect in order to broaden the support 
base for the insurgency. Well-organized Marxist-inspired groups, such as the 
NLF and DLF, which operated in South Yemen and Oman respectively, were 
able to make use of nationalist sentiments to mobilize the population in their 
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favor. By employing various psychological techniques and propaganda, the NLF 
successfully manipulated the social-political climate to make British rule 
undesirable, both for the South Yemeni society and for the British policymakers. 
The withdrawal of the British forces from Aden and the Protectorate 
demonstrated the success of the NLF’s techniques. On the other hand, the DLF’s 
failure to produce a political change in their favor was related to the effectiveness 
of the counter campaign waged by the government’s forces. Understanding the 
political motives of the insurgency, Sultan Qaboos was able to implement those 
political and economical reforms which delegitimized the insurgency.  
Capabilities to disseminate propaganda varied according with the 
respective historical situations and the rebels’ abilities to procure necessary 
funds. Propaganda employed across the spectrum of rebel movements, from 
native Indians to Marxist inspired groups, ranged in complexity from word-of-
mouth communications, to elaborate techniques using mass-media, to spreading 
leaflets (employed only by the insurgents in Aden and Dhofar).   
Thus, agitators played an important role, their task being to “overcome the 
inevitable barriers in communication and to see that the message reach[ed] the 
target audience in a credible and meaningful form” (Molnar, 1966, p. xvi). Their 
appeals aimed at influencing the emotional side of the individual and encouraged 
a specific response from the target audience. For example, Aguinaldo 
emphasized the national character of the struggle against the Americans; the 
NLF had promoted the idea that the struggle against British rule had been going 
on for decades and it was the duty of every Yemeni to participate in the revolt; in 
Dhofar, people were mobilized around the idea of the unjust rule of Sultan Bin 
Taimur. In all cases, agitators were assisted in their effort by a profound 
understanding of the social and cultural rules.  
2. Natural Environment 
The natural environment significantly affected the mobility and scale of the 
engagements, of both the insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. However, the 
rebels (i.e., native Indians, Filipinos, South Yemeni and Omani tribesmen) were 
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able to overcome these hindrances more easily than were the counter-insurgent 
forces. This was due to the fact that insurgents were indigenous to the local 
areas of war, while the counter-insurgent forces were, in most cases, alien of the 
territory and, thus, had to adapt gradually to the new environment. 
Operating in small groups, insurgents were normally lightly equipped and 
had an intimate knowledge of the local topography. Mobility for the insurgents 
rested on their ability to travel long distances over rugged terrain. For 
transportation, insurgents relied on traditional means (i.e., horses, mules and 
camels) because this allowed them to carry their supplies over the rough terrain 
undetected. Moreover, their superb use of the terrain enhanced their ability to 
conduct operations in two ways. First, it allowed them to ambush larger U.S. and 
British Army formations, inflicting high casualties in the process; and second, it 
enabled them to evade their pursuers after attacking isolated military or police 
posts. The guerrilla’s great mobility allowed them to retain their tactical offensive 
posture in relation to governmental troops. In this way, the insurgents were able 
to prevail over U.S. and the British conventional forces who dependent on good 
roads to move their mounted armies during field operations.  
A thorough examination of the cases suggests that the forces involved in 
counter-insurgent endeavors succeeded in overcoming the problems posed by 
the natural environment, either through extensive patrolling, or through the 
cooperation of local populations. SAS troops in Oman overcame the insurgents 
in the Jebel Akhdar Mountains after discovering the secret passes that led to the 
high plateaus where the insurgents hid. American troops fighting in Philippine 
surmount the rough terrain in Northern Luzon by employing Macabebe scouts. 
Moreover, while fighting Indian tribes, the U.S. troops overcome the problem of 
natural environment through the use of Indian scouts and the implementation of 
innovative solutions. General Crook has become famous for successfully 
operating against the American Indians with mobile flying columns. He made his 
troops more mobile by replacing the traditional supply trains with mules, an 
unorthodox solution.  
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The most serious problem encountered by counter-insurgent forces 
operating in a foreign environment was the difficulties that came with 
acclimatization. Troops suffered from diseases to which the natives had grown 
immune. For example, the U.S. forces had a 60 percent depletion rate during the 
rainy season during the Philippine insurgency. Moreover, the newcomers’ 
equipment was often not suited to the new conditions. Failing to comprehend the 
impact of unsuitable equipment over the troops’ performances, U.S. military 
leaders did not change the standard army issues for the troops deployed to fight 
in the Philippines. Hence, soldiers had to operate in a hot, humid environment 
dressed in uniforms suited for colder areas of the United States.  
3. Human Environment 
To understand the struggles encountered in counter-insurgency efforts, 
one has to start with a thorough investigation of the social bonds of the people 
within which the insurgency takes place. Understanding the human environment 
(i.e., religion, customs, traditions, etc.), and how people interrelate with each 
other, make determining who is likely to support the guerrilla and who is not 
easier. In the case of Oman (i.e., Jebel Akhdar) and Yemen (i.e., Radfan 
Mountains), tribesmen relied heavily on family ties, whereas in Aden, the 
underground organizations co-opted people with different backgrounds. 
It is important to understand the mores and religion of the population 
because they may have a decisive influence upon human interactions. Being 
familiar with the cultural aspects of a population helps counter-insurgent forces 
understand how people behave under different conditions, and how to develop 
connections of trust with local populations. Because, as Sztompka (1999) writes, 
“it is precisely cultural rules that may play a powerful role in co-determining the 
degree to which trust or distrust prevail in a society, at a given historical moment” 
(p. 101).  
As the case studies showed, increased cultural awareness allowed 
security forces to develop strategies best suited to the particular requirements of 
the society in which they operated. Moreover, it facilitated access to the local 
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population, which, in turn, increased the level of intelligence collected. The fact 
that the SAS forces deployed in Dhofar spoke Arabic and operated in small units 
gave them better access to the local population. As a result, they were able to 
gather the needed information to conduct field operations and civic programs 
which further enhanced their inter-connectivity with the natives. A similar 
outcome was achieved by General Crook during the Indian campaigns. Due to 
the fact that he spoke many Indian dialects, General Crook was able to 
communicate freely with different tribes, thus, preventing translations biased 
against him. Additionally, both cases reveal that cultural understanding was 
essential in decreasing the reluctance of people to work with others from a 
different culture. Knowing what to expect from people increases the level of 
confidence among troops, while also helping to build trust among the locals.  
Conversely, when there was a lack of cultural awareness among the 
military personnel involved in counter-insurgency operations, the results were 
detrimental to the success of the campaign. Illustrative of this is the case of the 
British troops operating in Aden. The British troops’ attitude of superiority toward 
the natives, evidenced by the insulting language they used (e.g., British soldiers 
called the Arabs “wog” or “gollies”) produced friction between British and locals 
that eventually was used by the NLF in their propaganda (Newsinger, 2002, p. 
122). The lack of language capabilities and local knowledge on the part of the 
British forces operating in South Yemen allowed insurgents to retain the initiative. 
As a result, the population was reluctant to cooperate with the British forces, thus 
putting the military personnel “in a dilemma between the recommended policy of 
using minimum force and the necessity to react more forcefully” (Kostiner, 1984, 
p. 98). Hence, British forces failed to gain the needed legitimacy to secure the 
local population’s cooperation. Additionally, the lack of empathy demonstrated by 
British troops affected the working relations between them and the Yemeni 




B. USE OF FORCE 
As suggested thus far, insurgencies are, in general, conflicts that stem 
from a given society’s particular grievances. Case studies revealed that the U.S. 
and the British governments, when facing the challenges of an unconventional 
war initially approached their respective problems militarily, rather than politically. 
Through an aggressive employment of force, U.S. and British policymakers and 
military brass attempted to eliminate the effect (i.e., the insurgents) instead of 
addressing the problems which gave rise to the insurgency in the first place.  
Examining the pattern of military actions, there are some common issues 
that have remained constant over time. Sir Robert Thompson (1966) writes that 
commanders were “inclined to regard the local and regular units … as their main 
objective because military they present the only attractive target” (p. 31). Thus, 
the U.S. and the British armed forces, in most cases, relied on: 1) punitive 
expeditions conducted either by infantry formations or air power (i.e., Indian 
Wars, Philippine, Radfan, Dhofar, and Jebel Akhdar), 2) search operations (i.e., 
Aden, Dhofar), 3) search and destroy operations (i.e., Indian Wars, Philippine, 
Radfan) and 4) the use of “pseudo-gangs” (Philippine and Dhofar).  
A close look at the first three types of operations revealed that the main 
focus of the U.S. and the British militaries had been to subdue the insurgents 
with overwhelming force. However, instead of subduing the insurgents, the 
violence generated resentment among the populace. On the other hand, the use 
of “pseudo-gangs” allowed the U.S. and the British militaries to make a better use 
of their armed forces. Operating in small size units, the U.S. and the British 
troops were able to selectively use force against the armed guerrillas thus 
sparing civilians.  
Instead of uncovering weapons, or disrupting the insurgents’ activities, by 
launching these operations, the U.S. and British security forces created more 
discontent among the people, and in some cases (i.e., Aden, Radfan), created 
more insurgents. Hence, as Sir Richard Thompson (1966) says, the erratic use of  
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military force produced damage to guerrilla units that was only temporary. 
Insurgents could replace their losses as soon as governmental forces withdrew 
from the area (p. 31).  
C. SECURING PEOPLE’S LOYALTY 
The evidence suggests that securing people’s loyalty was a difficult task 
for both the U.S and the British armed forces involved in counter-insurgent 
endeavors. The main challenge was to establish friendly relations with the 
natives. In many situations, the lack of language competence among the soldiers 
in the field prevented them from achieving the best results. However, when 
military personnel succeeded in overcoming cultural and language barriers (i.e., 
Philippine and Dhofar), operational successes improved significantly. Thus, a 
“hearts and minds” campaigns replaced the focus on brute force and the process 
to pacify populations was eased. Moreover, civic actions also improved and 
security forces were able to offer better protection to the civilian population 
against the retaliatory actions of guerrillas. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Although superiority of firepower allowed the U.S. and the British forces to 
win battles against the insurgents, when taken as a whole, such tactics failed to 
ensure the success of the overall campaigns. Military operations alone were 
neither able to provide security to the population nor did they prevent people from 
supporting guerrillas. Rather, it was a combination of comprehensive social, 
economic and political strategies that, in the end, produced the most lasting 
effects. Enhanced language abilities and cultural awareness constituted key 
factors in the success of those strategies. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES 
This chapter will summarize the main benefits of having enhanced 
language training and cultural understanding. Drawing some valid lessons from 
the U.S. and the British militaries, there is a hope to increase the efficiency of the 
Romanian Armed Forces that are engaged in Unconventional Warfare and 
Foreign Internal Defence.  
A. SUMMARY  
The starting premise of this thesis is that language and cultural training 
can serve to enhance a military’s capability to successfully counter an 
insurgency. Language and cultural knowledge will result in a better 
understanding of the population and therefore produce the type of intelligence 
required for successful military operations. This will lead to a more selective and 
effective use of force by the military. Whereas, cultural awareness gives counter-
insurgent forces a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, 
the addition of language abilities can provide the necessary tools to gather 
intelligence through better interactions with local populations.  
By examining four situations where U.S. and British forces were involved 
in counter-insurgent endeavors, this thesis revealed that the main impediment for 
security forces was their difficulty differentiating between the guerrillas and the 
general civilian population. Operating among local people, whose cooperation 
was secured through either the use of terror or propaganda, insurgents were able 
to avoid detection by security forces. This underground base of intelligence 
provided the security screen, thus, allowing the rebels to retain an initiative in 
relation to governmental forces. Insurgents usually conducted their attacks at 
times and places of their choice. The response of the U.S. and British security 
forces to insurgent strikes varied and was influenced by troops’ prior training and 
experience in unconventional warfare.  
In the cases studied, where the level of cultural awareness was low and 
troops lacked language training, security forces tended to rely solely on brute 
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force to fight the insurgents. Missing the necessary tools to build meaningful ties 
with the population in order to secure their cooperation, both the U.S. and the 
British conventional forces had to conduct large scale operations without good 
intelligence. Civilians were reluctant to give information about the rebels, 
especially in the early stages, because they either sympathized with or feared the 
guerrillas or distrusted the government troops. Hence, because of the 
government forces’ inability to discern between friend and foe, security forces 
ended up abusing innocent civilians and violating local customs, thereby 
increasing the discontent among the people.  
Conversely, where troops had the ability to speak the local language (e.g., 
as the British SAS are able to do in Dhofar), thereby co-opting natives in their 
counter-insurgent endeavors, the results were positive. Operating in small joint 
patrols with the local security forces, the U.S. and the British soldiers attained 
much easier access to the local population, and, thus to the information 
necessary to capture or kill insurgents.  
This achievement improved the U.S. and British forces’ actions in a 
twofold way. First, they were able to better protect the civilians from the 
guerrillas’ retaliatory attacks; and, second, they were able to strike armed 
insurgent bands with more accuracy. In this way, security forces were able to 
steal the initiative from the insurgents, thereby stopping their momentum and 
regaining the initiative for the government.  
Analyses of the insurgency campaigns conducted by the U.S. and the 
British forces revealed that neither a “hearts and minds,” nor input denial 
strategies worked unless the counter-insurgent forces had a good understanding 
of the operational environment. Without properly trained people, governments 
cannot implement the economic, social and political reforms needed within a 
particular society.  However, this requires more than cultural and language 
training. Still, cultural and language training is a necessary (though insufficient) 
condition for countering insurgencies.  
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Evidence from the cases also points out that language and cultural 
training will enhance military personnel’s ability to work with people from a 
foreign culture in several ways:  
• It reduced the level of culture shock experienced by personnel. 
Knowing what to expect from the people reduces the tensions created 
by cultural differences and, thus, allowed military personnel to adapt 
easier to their new work environment. 
• It increases an understanding of local values. Cultural awareness 
helps people get over common stereotypes and erase prejudices 
regarding other cultures.  
• It increased the level of trust between troops and civilians. Speaking 
the language helped military personnel to overcome barriers to 
communication, thereby making interconnections easier with the 
natives.  
• It reduced the risks of failed communications and cultural conflicts. 
Different cultures have different ways of interpreting the signals given 
by the outside world. Knowledge of local customs allowed security 
forces to better understand how their actions were perceived by the 
locals. Moreover, cultural awareness gave them a valuable framework 
by which to shape their behavior when interacting with another person.  
The aforementioned benefits of language training and cultural sensitivity, 
in turn, translate into operational advantages for security forces involved in 
counter-insurgency endeavors. In summary language training and cultural 
sensitivity: 
• Enhances good will. Having cultural awareness and language abilities 
often changes people’s perception of the military force. Speaking the 
language and acting in a culturally acceptable manner will generate 
trust among the people for the forces involved. Trust is the key to 
everything else. 
• Improves and increases the collection of intelligence. By speaking the 
language and mastering the communication techniques specific to a 
given culture, military personnel can collect information from the local 
sources, first hand. Not having to rely on the services of a translator 
tends to give military personnel easier access to the natives and thus 
to information sources. For example, there are situations when people 
are reluctant to communicate through translators, and would rather 
disclose their information directly to foreign national military personnel. 
• Increases the operational tempo.  Military forces deployed in UW and 
FID missions have a better chance of coordinating efforts with local 
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security forces at the lowest level (i.e., squad or platoon level) during 
joint operations.  
• Allows for better planning of Psychological Operations campaigns. 
Understanding the cultural environment helps military planners 
comprehend how a specific populace interprets signals from the 
external environments. Additionally, speaking the language helps 
military planners find the right symbols and formulations to get their 
messages through.  
• Increases humanitarian effort. Cultural awareness and language 
abilities help civic action teams generate programs that would fit both 
cultural and physical needs of a particular population.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED  
• Insurgencies are protracted struggles which put a premium on the 
ability of the sides involved to use propaganda in order to mobilize 
people. 
• Military operations alone cannot effectively end an insurgency. It is the 
concentrated effort of social, economic and political reforms that 
makes a counterinsurgent effort successful.  
• Use of large-scale, conventional search operations and brute force 
inhibit the flow of information necessary to fight insurgents.  
• Intelligence collection in Unconventional Warfare rests on the ability to 
establish and secure a strong base of popular support.  
• Use of force does not prevent people from joining the insurgents. It 
often convinces people to join insurgency. 
• Under the stress of a new environment, military personnel often act in 
ways inappropriate with local customs  
• Military personnel who received language training were much more 
sensitive to the cultural differences, often trying to accommodate social 
norms of local communities. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES  
A close look at the operational benefits and the lessons learned here 
suggest that Romanian planners should take into consideration the importance of 
language training and cultural sensitivity for the development of its national 
counter-insurgency endeavors. In order to overcome the eventual problem 
Romanian forces may encounter in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in other 
areas where national contingents are deployed, the following recommendations 
should be considered:  
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• Development of new language courses, available to the leaders at 
tactical level, as they are the ones in closest contact with population. A 
special emphasis should be placed on those languages spoken in 
countries in the area of interest for the Romanian government. Since 
this area includes the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus, the 
courses should teach Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Albanian, Arabic, 
Farsi, Russian and Urdu. 
• Development of cultural awareness seminars with the help of 
anthropologists and sociologists that should teach military personnel 
about cultural aspects.  
• Predeployment cultural training for the units being deployed in a 
foreign country and, if possible, continuation of the cultural training in 
the area of deployment with the help of local people. 
• Use of native speaking teachers to teach the language courses and to 
give lectures to units ready to deploy abroad. 
• Use military personnel returning from foreign theaters of war as guest 
speakers for the units being deployed. 
• Field training exercises with foreign partners from Romania’s areas of 
interest to develop relations based on trust and to allow military 
personnel to experience cultural differences. It is especially important 
for the Special Forces, who have to work closely both with the 
indigenous forces and the population.  
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the best results against 
insurgents were achieved by small units. They have a small footprint within the 
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